The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to Developments in Forensic Science by Cooper, Sarah Lucy
Pace Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Winter 2013
Tribute to Hon. James D. Hopkins
Article 6
January 2013
The Collision of Law and Science: American Court
Responses to Developments in Forensic Science
Sarah Lucy Cooper
Birmingham City University, Centre for American Legal Studies
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Science and Technology
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to Developments in
Forensic Science, 33 Pace L. Rev. 234 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
COOPER FINAL 2/28/2013 11:03 PM 
 
234 
THE COLLISION OF LAW AND 
SCIENCE: 
AMERICAN COURT RESPONSES TO 
DEVELOPMENTS IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 
 
Sarah Lucy Cooper* 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2013, our scientific and technological capabilities 
continue to exceed all expectations. The capacity of DNA1 
evidence to identify specific sources consistently and with a 
 
*Sarah Lucy Cooper is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Birmingham City 
University’s Centre for American Legal Studies in the UK, and a Fellow at 
the Arizona Justice at Arizona State University. I would like to thank my two 
research assistants, Alice Storey and Daniel Gough who always do a superb 
job. I would also like to thank Dr. Jon Yorke, Dr. Haydn Davies, Professor 
Meryl Thomas, Professor Alex Kendall, Dr. Anne Richardson-Oakes, 
Professor Carrie Sperling, Professor Carolyn Hoyle, Professor Lissa Griffin, 
Paul Cooper, Christine Cooper, and Terri Smith for reviewing and discussing 
the themes of this paper with me. Finally, I would like to thank the Academy 
of Criminal Justice Sciences for allowing me to share an earlier draft of this 
paper at its annual conference in NYC in March 2012. 
1. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science Challenges 
for Trial Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the “Polybutadiene” Meets the 
“Bitumen”, 18 WIDENER L.J. 309, 320 (2009). 
 
DNA is the molecular structure in all living things 
that contains genetic information. DNA evidence is very 
durable and can be extracted from the smallest of remains 
many years after a crime. Equally significant is its 
“polymorphism,” meaning that, depending on the method 
used for its extraction, it is unique among humans and can 
identify the donor of the specimen with overwhelming 
accuracy. DNA testing can be extremely precise and can 
often demonstrate that only one person in billions could 
have been the source of the specimen evidence. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
1
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high degree of certainty has been rigorously tested,2 and it is 
widely accepted that a vast array of forensic sciences can 
engage in “individualization,” that is, identify the perpetrator 
of a crime “to the exclusion of all others.”3 With recent studies 
showing that jurors have an increased thirst for scientific 
evidence,4 these forensic sciences have rapidly re-shaped the 
criminal process.5 As such, television shows like CSI suggest 
forensic evidence is seamlessly and justifiably weaved into 
American courtrooms. In reality, however, the criminal justice 
system wrestles with scientific evidence, and its reliance on 
forensic science to identify criminals with absolute accuracy is 
troubling. 
Recently, the ability of many forensic sciences to engage in 
individualization has been called in to question. There are a 
number of reasons for this. First, DNA evidence has become 
the gold-standard by which other forensic techniques are 
 
2. See THE COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. 
CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING THE 
FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAS REPORT]. Although note that DNA evidence is not infallible. 
See Shelton, supra note 1, at 323-24. 
 
Although DNA profiling is clearly scientifically 
superior to other forensic identification evidence, it is not—
contrary to earlier pronouncements—infallible. DNA 
evidence and its underlying methodology are, of course, 
subject to human error. False positive DNA results have 
occurred and will undoubtedly continue to be part of the 
DNA testing landscape. Proffered evidence may still, as 
with other forensic science evidence, be the result of 
mistakes or contamination in its collection, testing, or 
interpretation. As the technology and methodology of DNA 
testing has progressed, it is the human errors that may 
present the biggest evidentiary challenges for trial judges. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
3. Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s 
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1082, 
1119 (1998) (quoting another source). 
4. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror 
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI 
Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 333 (2006). 
5. See generally Shelton, supra note 1 (discussing the rapid development 
of emerging technologies and their tremendous impact on the justice system). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
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judged.6 Unlike many forensic sciences, prolific testing has led 
to DNA evidence having a quantifiable and miniscule error 
rate.7 Thus, DNA has raised the bar as to what is scientifically 
acceptable for identifying a source “to the exclusion of all 
others.” Second, DNA evidence has revealed a disturbing 
number of wrongful convictions. To date, 302 people have been 
exonerated by post- conviction DNA evidence in the United 
States,8 and in over fifty percent of those cases, invalidated or 
improper forensic evidence played a role in convicting the 
defendant.9 Thus, the methodologies of many forensic sciences 
have been exposed as unreliable. Third, in 2009, the National 
Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) produced a landmark report—
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (“NAS Report”)—which concluded that “[w]ith the 
exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and 
with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection 
between evidence and a specific individual or source.”10 Soon 
after the report was published, the United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged that many forensic sciences are subject to 
“[s]erious deficiencies.”11 
This paper considers how American courts have responded 
to developments in forensic science by focusing on four popular 
forensic science disciplines: (1) fingerprint identification 
(friction ridge analysis); (2) firearms identification (tool-mark 
analysis); (3) bite mark identification (forensic odontology); and 
(4) arson investigation (fire science). Part I briefly explores the 
relationship between law and science. Part II charts the 
development of the legal frameworks that govern the 
admissibility of expert evidence in America. Part III discusses 
the identification methods employed by these four disciplines 
 
6. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
7. See id. at 7. 
8. Facts on Post Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exo
nerations.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2013). 
9. Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2012). 
10. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. 
11. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009). 
3
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and provides examples of erroneous identifications. Part IV 
comments on the NAS Report findings that relate to these four 
disciplines. Part V critically surveys responses by criminal 
courts between 1999 and 2011 to various admissibility 
challenges raised with respect to these four disciplines. Part VI 
concludes that over recent years the fingerprint identification, 
firearms identification, bite mark identification, and arson 
investigation communities have attempted to improve the 
reliability of their disciplines, but have failed to use 
identification methods with solid scientific underpinnings. 
Despite this shortcoming, most courts fail to discern the 
difference between valid and invalid science, and are reluctant 
to corral exaggerated expert testimony in certain fields. 
However, the courts’ failures are understandable. In sharp 
contrast to the storylines played out on popular television 
shows, forensic science does not always clarify legal 
ambiguities by leading straight to the culprit. In reality, law 
wrestles with science. This is largely because law and science 
have different cultures: law aims to stabilize society through 
predictability, whereas science embraces change to understand 
the natural world. Consequently, our understanding of forensic 
science frequently changes, but the law responds slowly, 
reluctantly, and often inconsistently. 
 
I. The Relationship Between Law and Science 
 
Science helps the law understand the world in which legal 
policy must operate.12 Science provides the law with a plethora 
of facts, ranging from the parentage of a child and the side 
effects of prescription drugs, to the workings of the Earth’s 
structures, atomic bombs and modern industry. Thus, it seems 
that law and science share a mutually convenient and benign 
relationship: lawyers look to science for certainty in the face of 
difficult legal questions, and science seemingly responds with 
an answer.13 
 
12. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE 
IN THE LAW 26 (1999). Faigman argues that “without [science], legal policy is 
literally blinded.” Id. 
13. Alex R. Hess, Book Note, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2009) (reviewing 
ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2000)). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
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However, there are problems at the intersection of law and 
science. Law and science clash culturally because of their 
different approaches to the world. As David Faigman puts it, 
“[s]cience progresses while law builds slowly on precedent. 
Science assumes that humankind is determined by some 
combination of nature and nurture, while law assumes that 
humankind can transcend these influences and exercise free 
will. Science is a cooperative endeavor, while most legal 
institutions operate on an adversary model.”14 These 
differences may be superficial and stereotypical,15 but they are 
not illusory. For example, Michael Saks argues that the 
inclination of courts to simply cite supportive precedents has 
“interfered with the courts’ inquiries about . . . purported 
science.”16 Additionally, Robin Feldman points out that the law 
is “too slow to adapt to the changing information available 
through the advancements of science . . . .”17 Scholars also 
argue that the adversarial trial system compounds these 
problems by admitting evidence that does not adequately 
represent the relevant scientific field.18 This is because, 
ordinarily, scientists at the margins of their disciplines are 
selected to testify due to their willingness to express extreme 
views in their proponent’s favor.19 
Although law and science take different approaches to the 
world, there are a number of reasons to believe that science can 
be a legitimate and reliable tool for the law. First, law and 
science arguably seek the same thing—the truth—and, as 
Faigman argues, law and science could “reconcile their cultural 
peculiarities in a common goal.”20 That said, one must 
acknowledge the “important differences between the quest for 
truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the 
laboratory.”21 The law seeks proof, which is not always the 
same as the truth. As Susan Haack explains: 
 
14. FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 56. 
15. Id. 
16. Saks, supra note 3, at 1105. 
17. Robin Feldman, Historic Perspectives on Law & Science, 2009 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 4. 
18. See FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 54. 
19. Id. at 54. 
20. Id. at 56. 
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993). 
5
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[A] jury is asked to decide whether guilt or 
liability has been established to the desired 
degree of proof. This is a very special kind of 
inquiry into a very special kind of proposition, 
and is constrained not only by the demands of 
evidence, but also by considerations of principle 
and policy. . . . Moreover, the procedures of a 
trial are quite unlike those of ordinary scientific 
or historical inquiry . . . .22 
 
Second, law is inherently evolutionary and adaptive.23 This 
means it at least has the capacity to evolve, ensuring more 
reliable scientific evidence enters the courtroom, despite some 
scholars’ opinions that when the law borrows from science its 
adaptive quality “breaks down.”24 However, one area in which 
American law has shown its evolutionary and adaptive ability 
is the development of legal frameworks governing the 
admissibility of expert evidence. These developments will be 
considered in Part II. 
 
II. The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in American 
Courtrooms 
 
Anglo-American judges have summoned people with 
specialized knowledge to aid in the legal process since the 
thirteenth century.25 The first rule identified for governing the 
admissibility of such evidence was the “commercial 
marketplace test.”26 Under this test, “expert” knowledge was 
 
22. Susan Haack, Inquiry and Advocacy, Fallibilism and Finality: 
Culture and Inference in Science and the Law, 2 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 205, 
206-07 (2003). 
23. Feldman, supra note 17, at 5. 
24. Id. at 103. Scholars argue legal rules and procedures hinder the 
courts’ ability to evolve. 
25. See Stephen Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Product Liability: 
An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 
134 (1995). 
26. The term “commercial market place test” was only recently coined. 
See generally David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the 
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and 
Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 
1803-05 (1994) (discussing the history and development of the commercial 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
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admissible if it had a commercial value and was beyond the 
knowledge of the fact-finder.27 The problems with this regime28 
were exposed in 1923 when James Frye attempted to introduce 
into evidence the results of a systolic blood pressure deception 
test.29 This attempt was problematic because although the 
matter was beyond the fact-finder’s knowledge, the test had no 
market value outside of the courtroom.30 Judge Van Orsdel 
resolved the conflict by enacting a new standard of 
admissibility, which demanded that a scientific principle or 
discovery be “sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”31 
Frye shifted the burden of analyzing the reliability of a 
theory from the judge to the relevant expert community.32 
Supposedly, this shift made any admissible testimony more 
credible.33 Despite its shortcomings,34 Frye was the dominant 
standard for determining the admissibility of expert evidence 
for over seventy years.35 
 
marketplace test). 
27. Saks, supra note 3, at 1073-74. 
28. The fact that an area of knowledge has a commercial value does not 
(and never has) automatically mean it is scientifically valid. See, e.g., id. at 
1074: 
 
The marketplace test had serious flaws, two of which 
concern us here. First, the marketplace test was incapable 
of distinguishing astrophysics from astrology. The market 
values both of them. Commercial value, then, is not a 
measure of scientific validity. A second problem was that 
some fields have little or no life in any commercial 
marketplace. Indeed, the fields that are the focus of this 
Article have little or no function outside of their possible 
courtroom utility. The courtroom is their marketplace. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
29. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
30. Sally Melnick, An Aura of Reliability: An Argument in Favor of 
Daubert, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 489, 491 (2000). 
31. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). 
32. See Melnick, supra note 30, at 491. 
33. Id.; see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (“The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community 
assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific 
method will have the determinative voice.”). 
34. See, e.g., Melnick, supra note 30, at 492-93. 
35. Maryellen Ryan, Comment, Ensuring Justice Prevails in the Wake of 
7
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In 1993, after two decades of Congress’s failure to clarify 
whether the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 
superseded Frye,36 in particular FRE 702,37 the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to clarify the matter.38 In Daubert, the 
Supreme Court found that FRE 702 superseded Frye.39 In so 
holding, the Justices charged the courts with ensuring the 
 
Theresa Canavan's Case: A Proposal for Reform, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 479, 
480 (2002). But see Saks, supra note 3, at 1076. 
 
In actuality, the Frye corollary was so minor a variant that 
it went unnoticed for decades. Indeed, Judge Van Orsdel 
himself ignored [the Frye standard] in another landmark 
scientific evidence case he handed down on the very same 
day he issued the Frye opinion. Frye was not cited by a 
single other court, federal or state, for a decade. During the 
first quarter century after its publication, Frye was cited in 
only eight federal cases and five state cases. That amounts 
to one case every other year in the entire country. During its 
second quarter century, it was cited fifty-four times in 
federal cases and twenty-nine times in state cases. The Frye 
test really was “discovered” only in the past few decades. 
Consequently, in the 1980's Frye was being cited as much 
each year as it had been in its first fifty years added 
together. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
36. Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing Forensic 
Evidence's Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying 
Daubert Isn't the Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 287 (2007); see also 
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Questioning the Judicial Role in Expert Testimony in 
Complex and Non-Complex Cases, 3 SEDONA CONF. J. 185, 186 (2002) (“The 
Advisory Committee's Note, accompanying Rule 702 indicates that the 
Committee knew that ‘[t]he rule is broadly phrased,’ and that the Committee 
believed that there was no better test of admissibility than to ask whether 
the testimony could assist the trier of fact.” (alteration in original)). 
37. The wording of FED. R. EVID. 702 departed from Frye. See Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); FED. R. EVID. 702. 
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-85 (1993). In 
that case, the Daubert family alleged that the prenatal drug ingested by the 
mother, and manufactured by Merrell Dow, caused serious birth defects in 
her two children. Merrell Dow proffered the testimony of a chemical exposure 
expert, who found the drug was not a risk factor for human birth defects, 
whereas the Daubert family presented eight experts who concluded the drug 
could cause birth defects. The lower courts sided with Merrell Dow after 
concluding the Dauberts’ experts did not satisfy Frye’s “general acceptance” 
standard. Id. 
39. Id. at 597-98. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
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relevance and reliability of expert testimony,40 and directed 
lower court judges to examine the principles and methodology 
of proffered scientific evidence, not just acceptance in the 
relevant scientific community.41 To assist the lower courts, the 
Supreme Court created a flexible, factor-based approach to 
analyze the reliability of expert testimony. These factors 
include: (1) whether a method can or has been tested;42 (2) the 
known or potential rate of error;43 (3) whether the methods 
have been subjected to peer review;44 (4) whether there are 
standards controlling the technique’s operation;45 and (5) the 
general acceptance of the method within the relevant 
community.46 
A number of criticisms have been leveled at Daubert,47 
which remains the leading standard for the admissibility of 
expert evidence.48 First, Daubert forces judges to become 
 
40. See id. at 591-92. 
41. Id. at 592-93. 
42. Id. at 593. 
43. Id. at 594. 
44. Id. at 593-94. 
45. Id. at 594. 
46. Id. 
47. Lower courts struggled to interpret Daubert, causing the Supreme 
Court to clarify its ruling in two subsequent cases. In Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Court determined that an appellate court, reviewing 
a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert 
should apply the “abuse of discretion” standard. In so holding, the Supreme 
Court limited the role of appellate courts in deciding whether to admit or 
exclude expert evidence, and emphasized that the main “gate-keeping” power 
remained with the trial judge. In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999), the Justices held that Daubert applied to all expert testimony, not 
just scientific testimony. This silenced claims that Daubert did not apply to 
the soft sciences. The Justices also held that trial courts may consider the five 
Daubert factors to the extent they are relevant. In other words, the Supreme 
Court did not endorse strict application of the Daubert factors. 
48. Note that Congress amended Rule 702 in 2000 to codify the “Daubert 
Trilogy.” FED. R. EVID. 702 now reads, 
 
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
9
COOPER FINAL 2/28/2013 11:03 PM 
2013] COLLISION OF LAW AND SCIENCE 243 
“amateur scientists.”49 Scholars argue that judges “do not think 
like scientists” and therefore do not have the capacity to ensure 
only reliable science enters the courtroom.50 As Saks notes: 
 
Just as legal training teaches one the 
intellectual skills to analyze legal problems, 
scientific training teaches one how to analyze 
empirical questions and proposed answers. This 
places judges in a weak position to know what 
questions need to be asked in order to test an 
empirical claim or how to evaluate the data 
offered in answer.51 
 
Still, it is arguable that pre-existing mechanisms within the 
legal process can help judges overcome this criticism. For 
example, judges can use pre-trial conference authority to 
narrow the disputed scientific issues; conduct pre-trial 
hearings where the court can examine potential experts; and 
appoint independent experts, special masters, and specially 
trained law clerks.52 A less sympathetic view contends that 
because trial courts are the principal consumer of scientific 
expertise, judges should simply “learn to evaluate what they 
are getting for their dollar.”53 
A second criticism is that Daubert, and its progeny, 
significantly (and inappropriately) tip the delicate balance of 
power between judge and jury in favor of the judge when it 
comes to evaluating expert testimony.54 If, however, one 
 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case. 
 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 9 (Comm. Print 2010). Like Daubert and its progeny, Rule 702 
forces courts to question the empirical underpinnings of all expert testimony 
and to exclude opinions that are “connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 157. 
49. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
50. Saks, supra note 3, at 1136. 
51. Id. 
52. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
53. FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 64. 
54. Ryan, supra note 35, at 491. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
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subscribes to the view that the juror population has succumbed 
to a “CSI Effect,”55 this criticism is perhaps diluted. As Shelton 
describes: 
 
It is widely perceived . . . that modern 
juries give a great deal of weight to scientific 
evidence. They complain that jurors today 
demand more from the prosecution in the way of 
scientific evidence and that they will wrongfully 
acquit defendants when such evidence is not 
presented. Most of the blame for these 
expectations is heaped on a single television 
show, CSI (and its spin-offs), to the degree that it 
has become known, both in the popular media 
and in legal circles, as the “CSI effect.”56 
 
In partial support of this view,57 a study conducted by 
 
55. Shelton, supra note 1, at 371. 
56. Id.; see also Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the 
Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 433 (2006). 
 
The best-known definition states that CSI creates 
unreasonable expectations on the part of jurors, making it 
more difficult for prosecutors to obtain convictions. The 
second definition, which runs contrary to the first, refers to 
the way that CSI raises the stature of scientific evidence to 
virtual infallibility, thus making scientific evidence 
impenetrable. 
 
Id. 
57. It should be noted that, overall, Shelton’s study (and studies 
subsequent to it) found that jurors’ increased expectations and demands for 
scientific evidence are not related to watching CSI or similar television 
programs. Instead, Shelton found 
 
[r]ather than any direct “CSI effect” from watching certain 
types of television programs . . . these juror expectations of 
and demands for scientific evidence are the result of broader 
changes in popular culture related to advancements in both 
technology and information distribution. Those broad and 
pervasive changes in technology lead jurors to expect that 
the prosecutor will obtain and present the scientific 
evidence that technology has made possible. These 
increased expectations and demands of jurors therefore 
could be more accurately referred to as the tech effect. 
11
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Shelton found that jurors “expect prosecutors to present 
scientific evidence and that, especially in cases where the rest 
of the evidence is circumstantial, they will demand scientific 
evidence before they will return a verdict of guilty.”58 On the 
other hand, a study by Podlas returned data that denied “the 
existence of any negative effect of CSI on ‘not guilty’ verdicts. . . 
. If anything, the data hints that, if there is any effect of CSI, it 
is to exalt the infallibility of forensic evidence, favor the 
prosecution, or pre-dispose jurors toward findings of guilt.”59 
By inviting stakeholders in the criminal justice system to 
take a new look at old scientific evidence, Daubert has made 
many scientific evidence-related precedents vulnerable to 
reconsideration and reversal.60 The identification methods 
employed by many forensic sciences, including fingerprint 
identification, firearms identification, bite mark identification, 
and arson investigation, are among the most vulnerable.61 Part 
III details the methods employed by these four disciplines, 
which are allegedly open to Daubert challenges. 
 
 
 
Shelton, Kim & Barak, supra note 4, at 368. 
58. Shelton, supra note 1, at 372. 
59. Podlas, supra note 56, at 465 (emphasis added). Despite this result, 
Podlas advocates for stakeholders in the criminal justice system to tackle the 
concept of the CSI Effect. 
 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the evidence disputing a 
“CSI Effect,” if the public, the media, and the legal system 
do not accept or learn of this “proof,” accusations of the “CSI 
Effect” will continue. Ultimately, much like the unfounded 
tort crisis, CSI horror stories of justice denied may drive 
legal “reforms” when no reforms are needed or cause the 
issue to improperly enter trial arguments. Consequently, 
before the “CSI Effect” has time and media repetition to 
embed itself into the psyche of the public and members of 
the justice system, it should be exposed for what it is: 
nothing more than fiction. 
 
Id. 
60. Saks, supra note 3, at 1072. 
61. Id. Note that some commentators were skeptical about Daubert's 
likely impact on forensic science. See, e.g., Randolph Jonakait, The Meaning 
of Daubert and What it Means for Forensic Science, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2103 
(1994). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6
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III. Methods and Mistakes of Identification: Fingerprint 
Identification, Firearms Identification, Bite-Mark 
Identification, and Arson Investigation 
 
A. Fingerprint Identification 
 
When a person’s hand (or foot) touches certain surfaces, 
the ridges on their skin leave a printed impression on the 
surface touched. For over a century, the practice of “matching” 
a crime scene print to an inked suspect print, known as friction 
ridge analysis, has gained universal acceptance.62 Proponents 
of fingerprint identification make three crucial claims: (1) every 
individual possesses a unique and permanent set of 
fingerprints;63 (2) fingerprint examiners can identify the donor 
of a crime scene print (“latent print”) “to the exclusion of all 
others;”64 and (3) fingerprint identification is infallible and has 
a zero, or close to zero, error rate.65 The most common method 
of fingerprint identification in the United States is the 
Analysis–Comparison–Evaluation–Verification (“ACE–V”) 
 
62. Saks, supra note 3, at 1101. 
63. Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for 
Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed 
Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 527 (2004). 
64. Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating Post-
Conviction Claims of Fingerprint Misidentification After the NAS Report, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 267, 273 (“The fingerprint literature suggests that 
examiners testify as follows: Q: How sure are you that those two prints were 
made by the same finger? A: Absolutely sure! I don't testify to probabilities.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
65. Id. at 273-74. 
 
[T]he third premise of fingerprint identifications is one of 
“infallibility.” Many in the latent fingerprint community 
also testify that the ACE-V comparison method has a “zero 
error rate.” They claim that when the method is used by 
well-trained and experienced examiners, no errors are ever 
made, so that the method itself is error free. Thus, the claim 
is that erroneous identifications are only made by poorly 
trained or inexperienced practitioners. In other words, the 
“methodological” (sometimes called “scientific”) error rate is 
zero while the “practitioner” (sometimes called “human”) 
error rate is unknown. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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method.66 To conduct an examination using this method, the 
fingerprint examiner needs a latent print and a known print 
(“suspect print”).67 
“The analysis phase relies on a ‘qualitative and 
quantitative’ assessment of friction ridge detail at three levels 
of granularity: (1) ridge flow . . .; (2) individual ridge 
examination . . .; and (3) . . . [an] examination of pores.”68 The 
latent print is analyzed first, followed by the suspect print.69 
“The comparison phase involves a side-by-side observation” of 
both the latent print and the suspect print.70 The examiner 
observes the “friction ridge detail to determine if the details 
match in similarity, sequence, and spatial relationship.”71 No 
set number of similarities (i.e., “points”) are indicative of a 
“match.”72 The evaluation phase “requires the examiner to form 
a conclusion about the prints”: (1) the prints may match 
(“individualization” or “identification”); (2) the prints may not 
match (“exclusion”); or (3) the results may be inconclusive.73 
The comparison and evaluation phases both require the 
examiner to exercise independent judgment, which is based on 
 
66. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 14 n.2 (Mass. 2005). 
67. United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
68. Id. “The first level of detail can be used to exclude but not identify, a 
print, while a combination of the second and third levels of detail may allow 
for either identification or exclusion. If either . . . print is unsuitable for 
examination, the analysis ends.” Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. “[D]ifferences in the fingerprints do not necessarily end the 
analysis; rather, the examiner must determine whether the dissimilarity is 
explainable given pressure differences, surface texture, print medium (e.g., 
ink, sweat, or blood), and other expected variations.” Id. 
72. Id. 
 
No set number of similarities—sometimes known as 
“points”—indicates a “match,” since it is both the quantity 
and quality of similarities that allow for identification. 
Likewise, the number of explained dissimilarities—that is, 
dissimilarities believed to be the result of expected 
variations—is not dispositive either for or against finding a 
match. 
 
Id. 
73. Id. 
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individual training and experience.74 In the final phase, 
verification, “a second examiner is provided the same prints 
and checks the work of the first examiner.”75 
However, fingerprint identification is not error-free. The 
most high profile example of a debunked fingerprint “match” is 
in the case of Brandon Mayfield.76 In March 2004, the Madrid 
bombings killed 192 people and injured thousands.77 A bag of 
detonators found near the explosion site contained a 
fingerprint.78 Three FBI examiners concluded that the print 
was an “[one hundred] percent positive identification” of 
Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon attorney.79 After two weeks in 
prison, Mayfield was released due to an erroneous 
identification.80 An Algerian suspect’s DNA was found in an 
inculpatory area,81 and his prints closely “matched” those found 
on the bag of detonators at the explosion site.82 
 
B. Firearms Identification 
 
American courts have admitted firearms identification 
evidence for over eighty years.83 Investigators regularly seek to 
identify a particular gun as the source of suspect 
ammunition.84 When the hard metal of an internal part of a 
gun connects with the softer metal of the ammunition, the gun 
 
74. Id. 
75. Id. Notably, the second examiner is aware of the first examiner's 
conclusion. 
76. Professor Simon Cole has labeled the Mayfield error as “probably the 
most highly publicized fingerprint error ever exposed.” Simon A. Cole, More 
than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 985 (2005). 
77. Elaine Sciolino, Bombings in Madrid: The Attack; 10 Bombs Shatter 
Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1. 
78. Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 36, at 325. 
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80. Susan Schmidt, Oregon Lawyer's Status Remains Murky, WASH. 
POST, May 22, 2004, at A2. 
81. Tomas Alex Tizon et al., Critics Galvanized by Oregon Lawyer's 
Case, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A13. 
82. See Schmidt, supra note 80. 
83. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 35:1, at 642-43 (2011-2012 ed. 
2011). 
84. Shelton, supra note 1, at 335. 
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makes a “tool-mark” on the ammunition.85 Tool-marks can be 
divided into class, sub-class, and individual characteristics.86 
Class characteristics are the distinctively designed features of 
a class of tools, and are present on every tool in that class.87 
Individual characteristics are unique to a particular tool, and 
consist of random, microscopic imperfections and irregularities 
on the tool’s surface.88 Sub-class characteristics straddle the 
line between class and individual characteristics.89 These 
characteristics arise when manufacturing processes create 
batches of tools that are similar to each other, but that are 
distinct from other tools of the same class.90 Firearms 
identification is premised on the notion that a weapon leaves 
unique tool-marks on the ammunition it fires, and those marks 
are reproduced each time the weapon is discharged.91 Thus, 
many firearms examiners believe they have the ability to 
conclude that a particular gun fired a particular bullet to the 
“exclusion of all other[s] . . . .”92 
However, examiners can be very conflicted in their views of 
the same evidence. For example, during a 1989 investigation of 
several prostitution-related murders, Rickey Ross, a Sheriff’s 
Deputy, was arrested for soliciting and accompanying a 
prostitute.93 In three of the murder cases, the offender shot the 
prostitutes with a handgun.94 Two police officers concluded that 
 
85. When a gun is fired, two distinct types of tool-marks may be created: 
striations and impressions. Striations are similar to small scratches, and are 
most often produced on the bullet as it passes through the gun barrel. 
Impressions usually resemble dimples or craters, and are typically produced 
on the cartridge as it comes into contact with the various internal parts of the 
firing chamber (e.g. the firing pin, breach face, extractor, and ejector). Adina 
Schwartz, Challenging Firearms and Toolmark Identification—Part One, 
CHAMPION MAG., Oct. 2008, at 10, 12. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. See id. 
90. Id. Sub-class characteristics cannot be said to be individual 
characteristics because they are shared by more than one tool. Nor can they 
be said to be class characteristics because they are not shared by every tool in 
that class. 
91. See Shelton, supra note 1, at 335-36. 
92. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 14. 
93. Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 36, at 338-39. 
94. Id. at 339. 
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COOPER FINAL 2/28/2013 11:03 PM 
250 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
Ross’s firearm and “no other weapon” could have discharged 
the fatal bullets.95 Ross was charged with murdering three 
prostitutes, but was later released when three other experts 
concluded that the evidence “overwhelmingly exclude[d]” Ross’s 
firearm as the offending weapon.96 
In 1998, the Association of Firearms and Toolmark 
Examiners (“AFTE”)97 developed a protocol detailing when an 
examiner may reach a certain conclusion (“AFTE Protocol”).98 
Presently, the AFTE Protocol is the industry standard by 
which examiners conduct their examinations. Under the AFTE 
Protocol, an examiner may make one of the following four 
conclusions: (1) identification, (2) inconclusive, (3) elimination, 
or (4) unsuitable for comparison.99 To make an “identification” 
(i.e., a “match”), there must be “sufficient agreement” between 
the tool-marks present on ammunition found at a crime scene 
and a test cartridge fired from a suspect weapon.100 
 
95. Id. at 338. 
96. Id. at 339 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. The AFTE is an international organization of firearms and toolmark 
examiners and is the leading professional organization in the field. 
98. Ass’n of Firearms & Toolmark Exam’rs, Theory of Identification as It 
Relates to Toolmarks, 30 ASS’N FIREARMS & TOOLMARK EXAMINERS J., no. 1, 
Winter 1998, at 86. The AFTE Protocol is meant to be a practical application 
of the AFTE’s Theory of Identification. 
99. Id. at 86-87. These conclusions apply to the identification of a 
weapon as a whole, not simply to the individual marks an examiner may be 
comparing. That is, the AFTE’s protocol does not anticipate conclusions that, 
for instance, the firing pin marks are Identifications, the breach face marks 
are Inconclusive, and the ejector marks are Eliminations. Such a 
schizophrenic application of the protocol would be of no use to a jury. Rather, 
the protocol anticipates that the combination of the marks examined will 
cumulatively reveal which conclusion the examiner may reach regarding the 
weapon itself. A conclusion is “Inconclusive” (e.g. a particular weapon may, or 
may not, have made a particular mark) when there is: “[s]ome agreement of 
individual characteristics and all discernable class characteristics, but 
insufficient for identification,” Id. at 87; or “[a]greement of all discernable 
class characteristics without agreement or disagreement of individual 
characteristics due to an absence, insufficiency, or lack of reproducibility,” 
Id.; or “[a]greement of all discernible class characteristics and disagreement 
of individual characteristics, but insufficient for elimination.” Id. An 
“elimination” (i.e., a particular weapon did not make a particular mark) is 
made when there is “[s]ignificant disagreement of discernable class 
characteristics and/or individual characteristics.” Id. Finally, where the 
marks presented are “unsuitable for comparison,” the examiner must make 
no conclusion. Id. 
100. The AFTE Theory of Identification allows an examiner to conclude 
17
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C. Bite Mark Identification 
 
Bite-mark identification is a specialized subset within the 
broader discipline of forensic odontology.101 In a criminal case, 
forensic odontologists “compare a suspect’s dentition with a 
latent mark left in the victim’s flesh, or in some edible 
substance found at the scene of the crime,” to determine 
whether the two samples “match.”102 “The basic premise 
underlying bite mark forensic evidence is that human dentition 
is unique . . . .”103 Thus, bite mark evidence is considered a 
method of individualization. Since 1980, nearly all American 
states have admitted bite mark evidence.104 
The American Board of Forensic Odontology (“ABFO”) 
developed “the first standardized guidelines for the collection 
and analysis of bite mark evidence.”105 According to these 
guidelines, “[t]he standard comparison technique . . . is to 
match a photograph or model of the bite mark to a template of 
the suspect’s dentition through an overlay technique at the 
same scale.”106 “The ABFO has created a scoring guide to 
evaluate the strength of the comparison. Points are awarded 
 
that a particular tool made a particular mark when there is “sufficient 
agreement” between the tool and the mark. “Sufficient agreement” exists 
when “the agreement is of a quantity and quality that the likelihood another 
tool could have made the mark is so remote as to be considered a practical 
impossibility.” AFTE Criteria for Identification Committee, Theory of 
Identification, Range of Striae Comparison Reports and Modified Glossary 
Definitions – an AFTE Criteria for Identification Committee Report, 24 ASS’N 
FIREARMS & TOOLMARK EXAMINERS J. no. 2, April 1992, at 336-40. 
101. Saks, supra note 3, at 1119. 
102. Id. 
103. Shelton, supra note 1, at 346. Many courts have accepted the basic 
concept of dental uniqueness. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The 
Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1372 
(2008). 
104. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 37:4, at 6 (2011-2012 ed. 2011). 
105. Steven Weigler, Bite Mark Evidence: Forensic Odontology and the 
Law, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 303, 307 (1992). “In its statement of purpose, [ABFO] 
noted that ‘careful use of these guidelines in bite mark analysis will enhance 
the quality of the investigation and the conclusions.’” Id. at 307-08. The 
guidelines advise experts in relation to “the description of the bite mark, 
collection of the evidence from the victim, collection of the evidence from the 
suspect, and the analysis of the evidence.” Id. 
106. Id. at 309 (footnotes omitted). 
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for various matches in gross dental anatomy, tooth position, 
and intradental features.”107 
ABFO guidelines do not protect all criminal defendants. In 
1991, Ray Krone was convicted of murdering a bartender who 
was found with a bite mark on her breast. Prior to trial, a FBI 
odontologist told investigators that it “‘could not have been 
clearer’” that Krone was not the donor of the bite mark.108 
However, at trial, the state’s expert testified that there was a 
“definite match” between Krone’s teeth and the bite mark.109 
The state’s expert also misstated some relevant statistics while 
testifying: “the possibilities of two teeth being in the same 
position, it would be 150 times 150, whatever that is. Maybe 
1200 or something like that.”110 In 2002, DNA evidence 
exonerated Krone and identified the real culprit.111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 
A 1986 study published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences 
reports a high degree of reliability associated with the use of 
the scoring guide. However, in 1988, the authors of the 1986 
study seemed to recant their initial optimism when they 
stated: Subsequent discussion and review has led the 
authors to the conclusion that much more work and 
consideration will be needed before a stable and accurate 
index is developed that can be widely applied. . . . [T]he 
authors' present recommendation is that all odontologists 
await the results of further research before relying on 
precise point counts in evidentiary proceedings. 
 
The scoring guidelines are merely a guide and should not be relied upon 
exclusively. Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
108. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 103-05 (1st ed. 2011) (quoting Robert Nelson, 
About Face, PHX. NEW TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, 
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2005-04-21/feature/about-face/). 
109. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110. Id. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111. Id. at 103-04. 
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D. Arson Investigation 
 
There are two types of fires: accidental fires and incendiary 
fires.112 The latter are treated as arson.113 Arson prosecutions 
often depend on whether the prosecution can show the 
presence of a chemical accelerant at the scene of the fire.114 
Fire investigators use chemical tests and their training and 
experience to identify alleged physical hallmarks of arson.115 
These hallmarks include pour patterns, “spider-web” glass, 
brown stains on the floor, and “V” shaped soot marks.116 Fire 
investigators often testify to observing these hallmarks in 
arson cases.117 
This practice has its limitations, however. In 1987, Ernest 
Willis was sentenced to death for purposely setting a fire that 
resulted in two deaths. The prosecution’s case rested primarily 
on arson experts who testified to identifying a number of arson 
hallmarks at the crime scene.118 Willis maintained that he was 
innocent.119 No accelerant was detected on Willis’s clothes, and 
prosecutors “never produced any evidence regarding the type of 
accelerant used to start the fire . . . .”120 In August 2004, the 
district court, taking into account expert evidence discrediting 
the validity of the arson hallmarks, granted Willis’s writ of 
habeas corpus.121 The state declined to appeal or retry Willis, 
and Willis was freed from death row in October 2004.122 
 
112. See Bruce L. Ottley, Beyond the Crime Laboratory: The 
Admissibility of Unconfirmed Forensic Evidence in Arson Cases, 36 NEW ENG. 
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 263, 269 (2010). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 266. 
115. David Grann, Trial By Fire–Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, 
THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann. 
116. Id. 
117. See Id. 
118. It was said that burn patterns and the degree of burning indicated 
that a flammable liquid was poured on the floor of the house. See Cooley & 
Oberfield, supra note 36, at 329–31. 
119. Willis v. Texas, 785 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), 
overruled by Estrada v. Texas, 313 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
120. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 331. 
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The National Fire Protection Agency (“NFPA”) produced a 
guide for fire and explosion Investigations (“NFPA 921”).123 
NFPA 921 recommends that investigators use the well-known 
“scientific method” of generating and testing hypotheses to 
determine the cause of a fire.124 The NFPA 921 guide details 
how fire patterns, burn damage, and other evidence can be 
used to explain the cause and origin of a fire, but it also 
requires investigators to exclude nine non-arson causes for 
certain fires before reaching a conclusion that the fire was 
incendiary.125 
The methods employed in the fields of fingerprint 
identification, firearms identification, bite mark identification, 
and arson investigation all assist the criminal justice process 
by providing expert knowledge capable of identifying the 
perpetrator of a crime to the exclusion of all others. DNA 
exonerations and questionable prosecutions expose the flaws of 
these disciplines: they are not underpinned by the scientific 
method; they have unknown error-rates; they rely heavily on 
subjective and experience-based evaluations, which can widely 
diverge; they allow for overstated conclusions; and they are 
governed by inadequate standards. These weaknesses fuelled 
the school of thought that these disciplines are inadmissible 
under Daubert.126 This school of thought intensified when the 
NAS produced its 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic Science 
in the United States: A Path Forward. The report’s findings will 
be considered in Part IV. 
 
123. NFPA 921 is a three-hundred-page manual originally published in 
1992 and updated periodically thereafter. As the manual itself explains, 
NFPA 921 was developed by the Technical Committee on Fire Investigations, 
which includes dozens of fire investigators from local, state, and national 
agencies. As the list of committee members suggests, and as confirmed by 
Robbins's own testimony, NFPA 921 has been peer-reviewed and is generally 
accepted in the community of fire investigators. The NFPA 921 has been 
widely disseminated in the field of fire investigation. United States v. Aman, 
748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
124. This methodology consists of seven steps: “(1) identify the problem; 
(2) define the problem; (3) collect data; (4) analyze the data; (5) develop a 
hypothesis; (6) test the hypothesis; and (7) following any repeated rounds of 
refining and testing the hypothesis, select the final conclusion.” Id. at 535. 
125. Id. at 535-36. 
126. Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the 
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 726-27 (2011). 
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IV. The Findings of the National Academy of Sciences: 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward (2009) 
 
Congress recognized the need for significant improvements 
in the forensic science system, and in 2005 commissioned the 
National Academy of Sciences to explore these problems. The 
purpose of the Academy, one of the world’s premier sources of 
independent, expert advice on scientific issues, was to report on 
the past, present, and future use of forensic science in 
America.127 The Academy spent two years collaborating with 
legal and scientific scholars and practitioners.128 It heard over 
eighty witnesses during sixteen days of testimony.129 The 
Academy issued a report containing its findings in 2009. 
The report was billed as a “‘blockbuster’ that [would 
overhaul] the legal landscape regarding forensic evidence,”130 
addressed the veracity of numerous forensic disciplines, and 
made many eye-opening findings. The report concluded that 
the forensic science system had “serious problems,”131 faced 
many challenges,132 and was accountable for multiple wrongful 
 
127. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at xix. 
128. Id. at xix-xx. 
129. Id. at 2. 
130. McMurtrie, supra note 64, at 267. 
131. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at xx. 
 
In considering the testimony and evidence that was 
presented to the committee, what surprised us the most was 
the consistency of the message that we heard: The forensic 
science system, encompassing both research and practice, 
has serious problems that can only be addressed by a 
national commitment to overhaul the current structure that 
supports the forensic science community in this country. 
This can only be done with effective leadership at the 
highest levels of both federal and state governments, 
pursuant to national standards, and with a significant 
infusion of federal funds. 
 
Id. 
132. Id. at 4-5. These challenges range from the lack of mandatory 
standardization, certification, and accreditation to problems associated with 
the interpretation of forensic evidence, to the need for research to establish 
limits and measures of performance. Id. at 6. 
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convictions.133 On the basis of the evidence before it, the NAS 
concluded, inter alia, that (1) “with the exception of nuclear 
DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has been rigorously 
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence 
and a specific individual or source”134 and (2) the existing legal 
framework governing the admissibility of forensic evidence in 
the United States was inadequate for resolving the problems 
identified.135 Additionally, the report made some specific 
findings regarding fingerprint identification, firearms 
identification, bite mark identification, and arson investigation. 
 
A. Fingerprint Identification 
 
The NAS Report acknowledged that “friction ridge analysis 
has served as a valuable tool, both to identify the guilty and to 
exclude the innocent,” and gave some support to the discipline’s 
 
133. Id. at 4. 
 
Those advances [DNA evidence testing], however, 
also have revealed that, in some cases, substantive 
information and testimony based on faulty forensic science 
analyses may have contributed to wrongful convictions of 
innocent people. This fact has demonstrated the potential 
danger of giving undue weight to evidence and testimony 
derived from imperfect testing and analysis. Moreover, 
imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes 
contributed to the admission of erroneous or misleading 
evidence. 
 
Id. 
134. Id. at 7. 
135. Id. at 85. 
 
The report finds that the existing legal regime—including 
the rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, 
the applicable standards governing appellate review of trial 
court decisions, the limitations of the adversary process, and 
judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific expertise 
necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence—is 
inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the 
forensic science disciplines. 
 
Id. 
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ability to engage in individualization.136 Due to the amount of 
detail available in friction ridges, NAS opined “[it’s] plausible 
that a careful comparison of two impressions can accurately 
discern whether or not they had a common source.”137 The 
report agreed that some scientific evidence supports the 
presumption that friction ridge patterns are unique and remain 
unchanged throughout a lifetime.138 
However, the report also found that the discipline was not 
“properly” underpinned.139 The NAS Report’s criticism spanned 
four areas. First, NAS found that ACE-V is not “specific enough 
to qualify as a validated method” because it “does not guard 
against bias; is too broad to ensure repeatability and 
transparency; and does not guarantee that two analysts 
following it will obtain the same results.”140 Thus, following 
ACE-V did not mean that one was “proceeding in a scientific 
manner or producing reliable results.”141 Second, NAS thought 
examiners needed to better document their analysis.142 Third, 
NAS opined that claims of a zero error-rate are clearly 
“unrealistic.”143 Fourth, NAS determined that more research is 
needed into ridge patterns and distribution, discriminating 
values and items that affect the quality of latent prints.144 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136. Id. at 142. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 143-44. 
139. Id. at 144. 
140. Id. at 142. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 143 (“Better documentation is needed of each step in the 
ACE-V process or its equivalent. At the very least, sufficient documentation 
is needed to reconstruct the analysis, if necessary.”). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 144-45. The NAS Report acknowledged that “additional 
research is also needed into ridge flow and crease pattern distribution on the 
hands and feet . . . , [and] more research is needed regarding the 
discriminating value of the various ridge formations and clusters of ridge 
formations.” Id. at 144. 
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B. Firearms Identification 
 
The NAS Report found that class characteristics can be 
“helpful in narrowing the pool of tools that may have left a 
distinctive mark,”145 and that individual characteristics “might, 
in some cases, be distinctive enough to suggest one particular 
source.”146 However, overall, the report concluded that “the 
scientific knowledge base for tool mark and firearms analysis is 
fairly limited.”147 In order to make the process of 
individualization more precise and repeatable, the report 
concluded “additional studies should be performed.”148 It 
further concluded that the AFTE Protocol was not defined in a 
sufficiently precise way for examiners to follow, particularly in 
relation to when an examiner can “match” two samples.149 The 
report berated the protocol, stating “[t]his AFTE document, 
which is the best guidance available for the field of tool mark 
identification, does not even consider, let alone address, 
questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability, or the 
 
145. Id. at 154. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 155. 
148. Id. at 154. Some studies have been performed to consider the 
degree of similarity that can be found between marks made by different tools 
and the variability in marks made by individual tool. 
149. Id. at 155. 
 
As noted above, AFTE has adopted a theory of 
identification, but it does not provide a specific protocol. It 
says that an examiner may offer an opinion that a specific 
tool or firearm was the source of a specific set of tool-
marks…when ‘sufficient agreement’ exists in the pattern of 
two sets of marks. 
 
Id. The standards define agreement as significant 
 
when it exceeds the best agreement demonstrated between 
tool marks known to have been produced by different tools 
and is consistent with the agreement demonstrated by tool 
marks known to have been produced by the same tool. The 
meaning of “exceeds the best agreement” and “consistent 
with” are not specified, and the examiner is expected to 
draw on his or her own experience. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25
COOPER FINAL 2/28/2013 11:03 PM 
2013] COLLISION OF LAW AND SCIENCE 259 
number of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of 
confidence.”150 
 
C. Bite Mark Identification 
 
The NAS Report found that “it is reasonable to assume 
that the process [bite mark identification] can sometimes 
reliably exclude suspects.”151 However, the report firmly 
rejected the notion that experts can identify a person, by their 
bite mark, “to the exclusion of all others.”152 The NAS found 
that there is no scientific basis for such claims153 and was 
concerned by the controversial nature of bite mark 
identification,154 the high rate of false-positive results,155 and 
the fact that “experts diverge widely in their evaluations of the 
same bite-mark evidence.”156 The report acknowledged that the 
ABFO guidelines attempt to standardize experts’ analysis, but 
criticized the guidelines for not offering scientific criteria for 
determining when a bite mark can be related to a person’s 
dentition and with what degree of probability.157 
 
D. Arson Analysis 
 
The NAS Report found that conclusions by fire 
investigators that a particular fire was arson, on the basis of 
rules of thumb, are not well founded.158 The report stated: 
 
Despite the paucity of research, some arson 
investigators continue to make determinations 
about whether or not a particular fire was set. 
However, according to testimony presented to the 
committee, many of the rules of thumb that are 
 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 176. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 173. 
155. Id. at 174. 
156. Id. at 176. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 173. 
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typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant 
was used (e.g., “alligatoring” of wood, specific 
char patterns) have been shown not to be true. 
Experiments should be designed to put arson 
investigations on a more solid scientific 
footing.159 
 
To help tackle the various shortcomings of forensic science, 
the NAS Report made thirteen recommendations, which 
included the creation of an entirely “new, strong, and 
independent” federal agency – The National Institute of 
Forensic Science (“NFIS”).160 NFIS would objectively oversee 
and regulate the practices of forensic science to ensure the 
development of rigorous research to determine the capabilities 
and the limits of forensic science.161 NFIS would have “no ties 
to the past,”162 but “the authority and resources to implement a 
fresh agenda designed to address the problems” identified in 
the 2009 NAS Report.163 
The Academy recommended that one area NFIS should 
focus upon is “developing programs to improve understanding 
of the forensic science disciplines and their limitations within 
legal systems.”164 Whether this envisions NFIS playing a role 
in improving the existing legal frameworks that govern the 
admissibility of forensic evidence, is unclear. One thing that is 
clear, however, is that American courts need help in evaluating 
forensic science. Despite the fact that (1) Daubert demands 
courts to ensure that forensic evidence rests on a reliable 
foundation, (2) scores of DNA exonerations have exposed the 
unreliability of various other forensic disciplines and 
examiners, and (3) the NAS has confirmed that the forensic 
science system has serious problems, many American courts 
are still failing to discern the differences between valid and 
invalid science. Despite the fact that our understanding of 
forensic science is changing, the law is responding slowly, 
 
159. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
160. Id. at 18, 19-33. 
161. Id. 19-22. 
162. Id. at 18. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 19-20 (Recommendation 1(h)). 
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reluctantly and often inconsistently. A snapshot of cases 
involving fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite 
mark identification, and arson investigation, between 2000 and 
2011, support this view. These cases are critically evaluated in 
Part V. 
 
V. A Critical Survey of American Criminal Court Responses 
to Legal Challenges Concerning Fingerprint Identification, 
Firearms Identification, Bite Mark Identification, and Arson 
Investigation Between 2000 and 2011 
 
A. Fingerprint Identification 
 
In 2002, Judge Pollak of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania surprised the 
American criminal justice system. In United States v. Llera 
Plaza (Llera Plaza I), after a Daubert review, Judge Pollak held 
that “no expert witness for any party will be permitted to 
testify that, in the opinion of the witness, a particular latent 
print is—or is not—the print of a particular person.”165 Judge 
Pollak’s ruling was the first “successful” defense challenge to 
fingerprint identification evidence.166 However, as Lawson 
explains, “Judge Pollak’s ruling was not radical. Pollak appears 
to be the first judge to fully analyze the scientific validity of 
fingerprints under the true tenets of the Daubert-Kumho 
standard. . . . [T]he expert’s ultimate conclusion regarding 
identity . . . lacked scientific validity.”167 
Llera Plaza I was short-lived, however. Weeks later, Judge 
Pollak reversed his decision.168 The reversal (Llera Plaza II) 
was based on Judge Pollak’s finding that the FBI’s ACE–V 
process was “essentially indistinguishable” from that of 
 
165. United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza I), Nos. 98-cr-362-10, 98-
cr-362-11, 98-cr-362-12, 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated and 
superseded, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
166. Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint 
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 34-35 (2003). 
167. Id. at 36. 
168. United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (vacating and superseding the prior decision upon 
reconsideration). 
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England’s New Scotland Yard.169 Judge Pollak bowed to 
precedent, stating “to postpone present in-court utilization of 
this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending such research would 
be to make the best the enemy of the good.”170 
Soon after Llera Plaza I and Llera Plaza II, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered United States v. Crisp.171 
Crisp was convicted of a bank robbery based in part on expert 
testimony that his right palm had produced a print recovered 
from a confession note.172 Crisp challenged the admission of the 
testimony under Daubert.173 The majority rejected Crisp’s 
claims. They found that precedent favored admission174: the 
principles underlying fingerprint identification bore the 
“imprimatur of a strong general acceptance;”175 the discipline 
had adequate standards controlling its operation because 
“fingerprint analysts are held to a consistent ‘points and 
characteristics’ approach to identification,”176 and examiners 
undergo proficiency tests;177 and there was testimony that the 
discipline had an “essentially zero” error-rate.178 The majority 
conceded that “further research . . . and the development of 
even more consistent professional standards is desirable,” but 
found, “‘[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.’”179 Notably, however, studies have 
rejected the idea that cross-examination cures “shaky” 
evidence: 
 
 
 
 
169. Id. at 575-76. 
170. Id. at 572. 
171. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003). 
172. Id. at 265. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 268. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 269. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc, 509 U.S. 
579, 596 (1993)) (alteration in original). 
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For example, in mock jury studies about 
the effectiveness of cross-examination, it 
apparently made little difference whether the 
defense challenged the expert testimony; 
whether the defense pointed out in cross 
examination that the expert’s conclusions were 
inconsistent with prior research and that the 
expert had not followed standard methodology; 
whether the defense not only cross-examined the 
prosecution expert, but also put on its own 
expert. Although the jurors discussed the expert 
evidence in their deliberations, and although 
there was a strong correlation between the 
prosecution expert’s testimony and the jury’s 
verdict preferences, the results did not vary 
among the first three conditions.180 
 
In his dissent, Judge Michael was also cautious about the 
power of cross-examination, stating that “adversarial testing 
simply means that the defense lawyer cross-examines the 
government’s expert. That, I concede, is important, but it only 
goes part way. In most criminal cases . . . the defendant does 
not have access to an independent expert who could review the 
analyses and conclusions of the prosecution’s expert.”181 This 
view is shared by Saks: “The maldistribution of forensic 
scientists so favors the prosecution that the defense has little 
access to any, which prevents the adversary process from 
working, as intended, to expose error.”182 
Judge Michael found that the fingerprint evidence (in 
Crisp’s case) failed Daubert review.183 He found that there was 
no record of testing on the reliability of fingerprint 
identification,184 that peer review in the fingerprint community 
did not “prompt critique or reanalysis by other scientists,”185 
and that the error-rate provided to the court was based on 
 
180. Beecher-Monas, supra note 103, at 1407 (footnotes omitted). 
181. Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
182. Saks, supra note 3, at 1093. 
183. Crisp, 324 F.3d at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 273-74. 
185. Id. at 274. 
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assumption and not scientific studies.186 Judge Michael also 
found that the discipline’s controlling standards were not 
universal.187 He was troubled by examiners’ subjective 
approach to determining a match between a latent print and a 
suspect print,188 and the lack of clarity with regards to whether 
proficiency tests represented real life conditions.189 Because the 
fingerprint examination community had not been sufficiently 
challenged internally or externally, Judge Michael opined that 
the technique was not generally accepted in the scientific 
community.190 With regard to precedent, Judge Michael 
concluded, “[t]he history of fingerprint identification and the 
dogged certainty of its examiners are insufficient to show that 
the technique is reliable.”191 As such, Judge Michael’s dissent 
added to the courts’ recent unease about the reliability of 
fingerprint evidence. 
In 2004, Byron Mitchell challenged the admission of 
fingerprint evidence that connected him to getaway car used in 
a robbery. In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I),192 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that 
fingerprint evidence passed “Daubert muster,”193 but applied a 
different approach to Llera Plaza II and Crisp. First, the court 
focused on the notion that the premises of fingerprint 
identification were “testable,” not whether they were actually 
underpinned by scientific testing.194 The court was persuaded 
that the reliability of fingerprint evidence had been tested by 
one hundred years of experience.195 Second, the court 
considered peer review in the context of whether the 
“verification” step of ACE–V constitutes effective peer review, 
as well as publication. The court heard evidence that 
“verification” was not always anonymous and that fingerprint 
examiners had “developed an ‘occupational norm of unanimity’ 
 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 275. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 274-75. 
190. Id. at 276. 
191. Id. at 278. 
192. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). 
193. Id. at 219. 
194. Id. at 235-38. 
195. Id. at 238. 
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that strongly discouraged the verifying examiner from 
challenging the identification made by the initial examiner.”196 
With that in mind, the court found “[l]ooking at the entire 
picture, the ACE–V verification step may not be peer review in 
its best form, but, on balance, the peer review factor does favor 
admission.”197 The court found that the “publication facet of 
peer review is not a strong factor, and neither reinforces nor 
detracts from our conclusion that the peer review factor favors 
admission.”198 Third, the court found that despite the fact an 
“error rate [had] not been precisely quantified . . . the absence 
of significant numbers of false positives in practice,” and the 
absence of false positives in two recent surveys meant the 
discipline’s error rate “strongly” favored admission.199 Unlike 
past cases, however, the court found that the discipline was 
lacking with regards to controlling standards.200 The court 
opined that the ACE-V method was “insubstantial” in 
comparison to the “elaborate and exhaustively refined 
standards found in many scientific and technical disciplines.”201 
 
196. Id. at 238-39. 
197. Id. at 239. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 241. 
 
We therefore accept that the error rate has been 
sufficiently identified to count this factor as strongly 
favoring admission of the evidence. The error rate has not 
been precisely quantified, but the various methods of 
estimating the error rate all suggest that it is very low. This 
follows from three pieces of evidence we identify above as 
favoring the government: (1) the absence of significant 
numbers of false positives in practice (despite the enormous 
incentive to discover them), (2) the absence of false positives 
in the FBI's state agency survey, and (3) the statistical 
computations based on the 50/50 experiment. 
 
Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. The court also found the discipline to be “generally accepted.” 
 
Thus we consider as one factor in the Daubert analysis 
whether fingerprint identification is generally accepted 
within the forensic identification community. The answer is 
yes, as demonstrated by the results of the FBI's survey of 
state agencies. … Mitchell's only argument with respect to 
this factor is that there is no scientific community that 
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In 2005, a Superior Court in Massachusetts found that the 
ACE-V method was “sufficiently reliable to admit expert 
opinion testimony regarding” a fingerprint match.202 Despite 
this typical ruling, the case of Commonwealth v. Patterson, 
shows a court restricting the acceptance of fingerprint 
identification evidence. In Patterson, an examiner used the 
ACE-V method “to determine that four latent impressions 
found on the victim’s vehicle were left by [the defendant].”203 
The examiner could not match any single latent impression to 
its “allegedly corresponding finger,” so based his testimony on 
the “cumulative similarities between the impressions and their 
corresponding fingers. The examiner opined that the four 
impressions could be analyzed collectively because they were 
simultaneous impressions, that is, impressions of multiple 
fingers made by the same hand at the same time.”204 The court 
held that application of ACE-V to simultaneous impressions 
did not satisfy Daubert, stating: 
 
the Commonwealth needed to establish more 
than the general reliability of latent fingerprint 
identification. It needed to establish that the 
theory, process, and method of latent fingerprint 
identification could be applied reliably to 
simultaneous impressions not capable of being 
individually matched to any of the fingers that 
supposedly made them.205 
 
 
 
generally accepts fingerprint identification. But the 
scientific/nonscientific distinction is irrelevant after Kumho 
Tire, and accordingly we reject the argument. We also note 
that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit . . . relied 
heavily on general acceptance to support the admission of 
fingerprint identification evidence. See United States v. 
Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003). We likewise conclude 
that this factor weighs in favor of admitting the evidence. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
202. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 2005). 
203. Id. at 14. 
204. Id. at 14-15. 
205. Id. at 15. 
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It should be noted, however, that the court emphasized that the 
traditional method of fingerprint identification satisfied 
Daubert.206 
Llera Plaza I and II, Crisp, Mitchell I, and Patterson 
demonstrate that American courts, to differing degrees and on 
the basis of different approaches to Daubert, had some concerns 
about the practice of fingerprint identification prior to the 
release of the NAS Report in February 2009. The impact of the 
NAS Report is considered in the following cases. 
In December 2009, Brian Rose challenged the admissibility 
of fingerprint evidence that allegedly linked him to a fatal 
carjacking. In United States v. Rose,207 a federal court in 
Maryland ruled that precedent,208 the general acceptance of the 
ACE-V method in the fingerprint community,209 and the lack of 
evidence to contradict the conclusion that misidentifications 
were extremely rare all favored the admission of the 
fingerprint evidence.210 The court acknowledged the NAS 
Report’s use of a study that found there was no “available 
scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method.”211 
However, the court emphasized that “the report itself did not 
conclude that fingerprint evidence was unreliable such as to 
render it inadmissible,”212 and its authors did not intend to 
answer the “question whether forensic evidence in a particular 
case is admissible under applicable law.”213 
In United States v. Baines,214 the United States Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals made no mention of the NAS Report 
when upholding a decision to admit evidence that a “thumb 
print found on some of the contraband . . . was a match to 
Baines’ [sic] print.”215 In so holding, the court took yet another 
approach to Daubert. Somewhat like the court in Mitchell I, the 
 
206. Id. at 32-33. 
207. United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723 (D. Md. 2009). 
208. Id. at 725. 
209. Id. at 726 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. (quoting Hon. Harry T. Edwards, Statement before U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee (Mar. 18, 2009)). 
214. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009). 
215. Id. at 980. 
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Tenth Circuit found that: 
 
[W]hile . . . this record does not show that 
[fingerprint identification] has been subject to 
testing that would meet all of the standards of 
science, it would be unrealistic in the extreme for 
us to ignore the countervailing evidence. 
Fingerprint identification has been used 
extensively by law enforcement agencies all over 
the world for almost a century.216 
 
However like Judge Michael in Crisp, the court acknowledged 
that proficiency tests had been heavily criticized. On that basis, 
the court opined that the testing factor did not weigh 
“powerfully” in favor of admission.217 Unlike the Mitchell I 
court, the Baines court found that peer review did not favor 
admissibility because “the verification stage of the ACE-V 
process is not the independent peer review of true science.”218 
Benedict agrees with this assessment, stating that the process 
of more than one fingerprint examiner performing the 
identification process 
 
is not the meaning of peer review under Daubert, 
or as used by scientists generally. Rather, the 
term refers to a formal submission of research to 
a scientific journal, whose editorial board of 
fellow scientists carefully examines it. It is not 
merely a second opinion rendered by another 
examiner . . . [that] does little to put a scientific 
gloss on the first opinion.219 
 
Like most other courts, the Tenth Circuit accepted that the 
discipline had a very low error rate, which “strongly” favored 
admission.220 The court put significant emphasis on the state’s 
 
216. Id. at 990. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Benedict, supra note 63, at 530 (alteration in original) (footnotes 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220. Baines, 573 F.3d at 991. 
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testimony that the discipline had an error rate of one in every 
eleven million cases, which was unchallenged by the defense.221 
In tackling the criticisms aimed at proficiency tests, the court 
acknowledged that “[v]ery few mistakes are reported in testing 
that trainees must complete before progressing to actual 
casework.”222 The court acknowledged the possibility of 
erroneous identifications and that “[d]efense attorneys rarely 
have the resources to hire independent experts for trial,” but 
found “even allowing for the likelihood that the actual error 
rate . . . may be higher than reflected[,] . . . the known error 
rate remains impressively low.”223 Applying Mitchell I, 
however, the court found the “controlling standards” factor did 
not favor admission, as ACE-V “is a procedural standard but 
not a substantive one. Critical steps in the process depend on 
the subjective judgment of the analyst.”224 The court relied on 
precedent to determine that fingerprint identification had an 
“overwhelming” acceptance in the courts (and other 
professional bodies), which favored admission.225 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the NAS 
Report in more detail in Commonwealth v. Gambora in 2010.226 
After being convicted of murder and other related offenses, 
Gambora used the NAS Report to challenge evidence that 
matched his fingerprints to latent prints found on a door. The 
court acknowledged, in considerable depth, the concerns raised 
about the reliability of fingerprint identification in the NAS 
 
221. Id. at 990-91. 
222. Id. at 990. 
223. Id. at 991. 
224. Id. Notably, the Tenth Circuit made this finding arguendo because 
the factor was not critical to its decision. 
225. Id. at 991-92. In closing, the court echoed the thoughts of 
 
Judge Pollak, who said regarding the desirability of 
research to provide the scrutiny and independent 
verification of the scientific method to aid in assessing the 
reliability of fingerprint evidence, that such efforts would be 
“all to the good. But to postpone present in-court utilization 
of this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending such research 
would be to make the best the enemy of the good.” 
 
Id. at 992 (quoting United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572 
(E.D. Pa. 2002)). 
226. Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2010). 
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Report. However, the court emphasized that the NAS Report 
had not argued for, and did not result in, the wholesale 
exclusion of fingerprint evidence.227 The court admitted the 
evidence.228 
Despite being a typical ruling, Gambora made two 
important impacts. First, it highlighted that some of the NAS 
Report’s conclusions are confusing. The court stated 
 
[a]s our discussion of the NAS Report reflects, 
there is tension in the report between its 
assessments that, on the one hand it seems 
plausible that a careful comparison of two 
impressions can accurately discern whether or 
not they had a common source, but that on the 
other, merely following the steps of ACE–V does 
not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific 
manner or producing reliable results.229 
 
The court felt unable to resolve this tension in Gambora.230 
Second, Gambora represents the first restriction on fingerprint 
identification evidence as a direct consequence of the NAS 
Report. The court said 
 
based on the NAS Report, we can say this much 
at the present time: Testimony to the effect that 
a latent print matches, or is “individualized” to, a 
known print, if it is to be offered, should be 
presented as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions 
expressing absolute certainty about, or the 
infallibility of, an “individualization” of a print 
should be avoided.231 
 
227. Id. at 58. 
228. It is important to note that the Gambora decision was somewhat 
molded by the fact the Defendant testified at trial that he put his hand on the 
door in question. Furthermore, substantial other evidence connected the 
defendant to the scene of the robbery and homicide. Id. at 61. 
229. Id. at 61 n.21 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
230. Id. at 61 n.22 
231. Id. However it should be noted that the court also concluded that 
“nothing in this [Gambora] opinion should be read to suggest that the 
existence of the NAS Report alone will require [Daubert] hearings as to the 
37
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Notably, shortly before the Gambora decision, the 
International Association for Identification (“IAI”)—the 
primary professional association for those engaged in forensic 
identification practices—also advocated for examiners to 
refrain from declaring individualizations. Resolution 2010-18 
resolves, inter alia, that “[e]xaminers shall only use 
mathematically based models that have been accepted as valid 
by the IAI in partnership with the relevant scientific 
community and in which they have been trained to 
competency.”232 
Weeks after Gambora, Ajmal Aman moved to exclude 
fingerprint evidence that allegedly linked him to an arson fire. 
In United States v. Aman,233 a United States District Court in 
Virginia opined that “[t]he absence of a known error rate, the 
lack of population studies, and the involvement of examiner 
judgment all raise important questions about the rigorousness 
of friction ridge analysis.”234 The court acknowledged the NAS 
Report’s concern that the discipline had not been subjected to 
population studies to demonstrate its precision,235 and noted 
 
general reliability of fingerprint identifications.” Id. 
232. Int’l Ass’n of Identification [IAI], Resolution 2010-18, ¶ 7 (July 16, 
2010). 
 
It is the responsibility of forensic experts to offer a clear and 
unambiguous presentation of their conclusions. Friction 
ridge skin impressions can display varying levels of 
commonality (pattern type, ridge flow) in appearance with 
other impressions which do not derive from the same source. 
Friction ridge skin impressions can share class 
characteristics (pattern type, ridge flow) and any 
associations based on these criteria require, ethically and 
professionally, that the examiner clearly state any 
limitations of their conclusions. The use of mathematically 
based models to assess the associative value of the evidence 
may provide a scientifically sound basis for supporting the 
examiner’s opinion. Examiners shall only use 
mathematically based models that have been accepted as 
valid by the IAI in partnership with the relevant scientific 
community and in which they have been trained to 
competency. 
 
Id. at ¶¶ 4-7. 
233. 748 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
234. Id. at 541. 
235. Id. at 540. 
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that “while fingerprint experts sometimes use terms like 
‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ to describe the confidence of their 
matches, the NRC has recognized that a zero-percent error rate 
is ‘not scientifically plausible.’”236 The court agreed that further 
testing and study would enhance the precision and 
reviewability of fingerprint examiners’ work,237 but, relying on 
Crisp, ruled that Aman’s challenge was appropriate for cross-
examination and not grounds for exclusion.238 
In June 2011, Donny Love challenged the admission of 
fingerprint evidence that allegedly connected him to the 2008 
bombing of a federal courthouse in San Diego. In United States 
v. Love,239 a United States District Court in California 
recognized that the NAS Report criticized some aspects of 
fingerprint analysis, but denied Love’s challenge. In so holding, 
the court used yet a different overall approach to Daubert. The 
court based its conclusion, in part, on precedent240 and on 
evidence that “the forensic science community generally . . . 
ha[s] beg[a]n to take appropriate steps to respond to [the] 
criticism [contained in the NAS Report] . . . .”241 With regards 
to error rate, the court picked up on a “May 2011 study of the 
performance of 169 fingerprint examiners [which] revealed a 
total of six false positives among 4,083 comparisons of non-
 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 541. 
238. Id. at 540 n.9. The Aman court relied on the Crisp court’s view that: 
 
[T]he district court heard testimony to the effect that the 
expert community has consistently vouched for the 
reliability of the fingerprinting identification technique over 
the course of decades . . . . The district court also heard 
evidence from which it was entitled to find the existence of 
professional standards controlling the technique's operation. 
Those standards provide adequate assurance of consistency 
among fingerprint analyses. Finally, the court heard 
testimony that fingerprint identification has an exceedingly 
low rate of error, and the court was likewise within its 
discretion in crediting that evidence. 
 
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003). 
239. United States v. Love, No. 10-cr-2418 (MMM), 2011 WL 2173644 
(S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011). 
240. Id. at *8. 
241. Id. 
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matching fingerprints for an overall false positive rate of 
0.1%.”242 
In response to the Defendant’s comments about Brandon 
Mayfield’s case, the court said “one confirmed misidentification 
is in no way inconsistent with an exceedingly low rate of error. 
. . . Of course, any misidentification is troublesome. Without 
more foundation, however, this statement does not translate 
into a quantifiable error rate.”243 With regards to controlling 
standards, the court acknowledged that the standards used in 
fingerprint analysis were insubstantial compared to those 
employed by scientific disciplines, citing Mitchell I.244 Unlike 
Mitchell I (and Baines), however, the Love court found that the 
procedural nature of the ACE-V method (in this case, in the 
context of the FBI) and the stringent qualification process for 
FBI Agents favored admission.245 
It was in its consideration of general acceptance that the 
Love court departed from precedent, finding it only weakly 
supported admission.246 The court agreed that the NAS Report 
demonstrated “some hesitancy in accepting latent fingerprint 
analysis on the part of the broader scientific community.”247 
However, the court did not reject “general acceptance” entirely 
because “forensic science and law enforcement communities 
strongly support the use of friction ridge analysis.”248 The court 
concluded that “[f]riction ridge analysis is not foolproof, but it 
is also far removed from the types of ‘junk science’ that must be 
excluded under . . . Daubert[] and Kumho.”249 This is contrary 
to one scholar’s view that the “gold standard” of fingerprinting 
identification may be more akin to “fool’s gold.”250 
 
 
 
242. Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at *6. 
245. Id. at *6-7. 
246. Id. at *7. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at *8. 
250. Brooke G. Malcom, Comment, Convictions Predicated on DNA 
Evidence Alone: How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 
313, 328 (2008). 
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In August 2011, after being convicted of first-degree 
murder, Edward Mitchell challenged the fingerprint evidence 
against him. In Illinois v. Mitchell (Mitchell II),251 the majority 
of the Illinois Appellate Court found that (1) the trial court did 
not err by admitting expert testimony that failed to account for 
five of the thirteen points allegedly found between Mitchell’s 
print and the suspect print; and (2) the trial court did not err 
by failing to conduct an admissibility hearing concerning the 
methodology used by the relevant fingerprint expert.252 The 
court made no substantive mention of the NAS report’s 
findings,253 but in his dissent, Judge Gordon appeared to follow 
the NAS Report’s findings in that he berated the experts 
involved for not making notes of their processes and 
conclusions.254 
Shortly after Mitchell II, United States v. Gutierrez-
Castro255 came before the United States District Court in New 
Mexico. In that case, Gutierrez-Castro was accused of “re-entry 
of an illegal alien” and the state wanted to introduce the 
testimony of James McNutt.256 McNutt would testify that 
suspect prints belonged to Gutierrez-Castro.257 In Gutierrez-
Castro, the Court used the NAS Report in a very narrow sense. 
Gutierrez-Castro argued that, while McNutt was a certified 
fingerprint examiner and that he had completed several classes 
on fingerprint analysis, the NAS Report “indicate[d] that 
certification may not be a valid indication of knowledge or 
ability.”258 Gutierrez-Castro argued there was no standardized 
or approved method of certification; hence McNutt was not 
qualified to offer expert testimony about fingerprint analysis. 
 
 
251. People v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 353 Ill. Dec. 369 (App. Ct. Aug. 5, 
2011). 
252. Id. at 373-76. 
253. The NAS Report’s description of the ACE-V method was mentioned. 
Id. at 386 (Gordon, J., dissenting). 
254. Id. at 382 (Gordon, J., dissenting). 
255. United States v. Gutierrez-Castro, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.N.M. 
2011). 
256. Id. at 1221-22. 
257. Id. at 1220. 
258. Id. at 1228. 
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Without engaging the NAS Report,259 the court rejected 
Gutierrez-Castro’s argument, seemingly siding with the state’s 
argument that “McNutt ha[d] undergone demanding training 
culminating in” regular proficiency tests.260 Like other courts, 
the Gutierrez-Castro court was not deterred by concerns that 
most proficiency tests do not reflect real-life conditions. 
Interestingly, the court gave permission for McNutt to testify, 
but would not allow: (1) the state to offer him as an expert 
witness in the jury’s presence; (2) the trial court to certify 
McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence; and (3) 
allow the jury instructions to refer to McNutt as an expert.261 
The Gutierrez-Castro decision arguably responds to the 
idea that jurors are easily seduced by people described as 
experts and as a consequence pay little attention to the veracity 
of the discipline they are tasked with judging.262 In the context 
of fingerprint identification, for example, studies have found 
that a vast majority of jurors agree that fingerprint 
identification is a “science”263 and that fingerprints are the 
most reliable means of identification.264  In United States v. 
Watkins, Eric Watkins challenged a decision to admit 
fingerprint evidence that linked him to, inter alia, an armed 
robbery.265 Specifically, Watkins challenged the state’s expert 
who claimed that when ACE–V “is used properly by a 
competent examiner, the error rate for identification is zero.”266 
 
259. Although the court noted that McNutt had acknowledged that the 
NAS Report calls into question ACE–V methodology. Id. at 1233. 
260. Id. at 1228. 
261. Id. The court held that the issues that the parties “bring out during 
McNutt's direct examination and cross-examination will go to the weight and 
credibility of McNutt's testimony.” Id. 
262. See Simon Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint 
Admissibility Rulings From Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004) (general proposition that jurors are easily seduced). 
263. Charles Illsley, Juries, Fingerprints, and the Expert Fingerprint 
Witness, Address at the International Symposium on Latent Prints (July 7-
11, 1987) (finding ninety-three percent of jurors agree that fingerprint 
identification is a science; only two percent disagree), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/forensics/for_lib/Documents/1056493657.7/Illsey.pdf. 
264. Id. (finding that eighty-four percent of potential jurors agree that 
“fingerprints are the most reliable means of identifying a person,” and only 
eight percent disagree). 
265. 450 F. App’x 511, 512 (6th Cir. 2011). 
266. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In support, Watkins cited the NAS Report’s conclusion that 
such claims were impractical.267 The Sixth Circuit rejected 
Watkins’s argument on two grounds. First, the court said that 
it would not consider evidence, namely the NAS Report, which 
was not before the lower court.268 Second, the court reasoned 
that even “assuming arguendo that the ACE–V method is not 
error-free, the fact that the fingerprint examiner testified that 
it was [one hundred percent] accurate does not by itself mean 
that the district court erred in determining that the ACE–V 
method was scientifically valid.”269 The court declined to hold 
that the “allegedly mistaken error-rate testimony negates the 
scientific validity of the ACE–V method given all the other 
factors that the district court was required to consider.”270 
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that between 2000 
and 2011 American courts favored the admission of fingerprint 
identification evidence under Daubert. In doing so, these courts 
relied heavily on precedent to support their decisions and on 
the adversary system to weed out the fragilities of fingerprint 
analysis. These cases also demonstrate that American courts 
are taking inconsistent approaches to Daubert. These cases 
demonstrate that, in descending order of potency, the courts 
have been most critical of peer review, controlling standards, 
and testability. The courts are noting that these three areas 
are lacking in scientific underpinnings. Additionally, the cases 
illustrate that American courts are persuaded that fingerprint 
identification has a low error-rate and is generally accepted in 
the relevant fields. 
The Aman, Rose, Baines, Gambora, Castro, Mitchell II, 
Love, and Watkins cases all demonstrate that courts are 
generally acknowledging the NAS Report since its publication. 
However, the courts are responding to the NAS Report’s 
criticisms of fingerprint analysis to different degrees. Some 
courts have paid lip service to the report, whereas others have 
engaged in a more extensive evaluation of its findings. Overall, 
post-NAS Report courts have: (1) made decisions to restrict 
 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 516. 
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testimony directly as a result of the NAS Report;271 (2) been 
more critical of the ability of fingerprint evidence to satisfy 
Daubert than pre-NAS Report courts, while not going so far as 
to deny admission of fingerprint evidence because of the NAS 
Report’s findings; (3) placed emphasis on the NAS Report’s 
position that it did not intend to answer the question of 
whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible 
under applicable law;272 (4) responded favorably to attempts by 
the forensic community to fill the gaps identified by the NAS 
Report;273 (5) highlighted areas of contradiction in the NAS 
Report’s conclusions;274 and (6) relied on precedent and the 
adversary process to resolve and neutralize their concerns 
about the reliability of fingerprint evidence in the light of the 
NAS Report.275 
 
B. Firearms Identification 
 
In the early stages of the new millennium, American 
courts continued to fully embrace firearms identification 
evidence that matched suspect ammunition to a weapon linked 
with a defendant. In United States v. Santiago, Judge Marrero 
was quick to point out that the Llera Plaza I decision had no 
bearing on “ballistics” cases, and there was no precedent 
suggesting “the entire field of ballistics identification is 
unreliable.”276 In United States v. Hicks, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that based on the 
widespread acceptance of firearms comparison testing, the 
existence of standards governing such testing, the discipline’s 
negligible error rate (the court received testimony that the 
error rate was “zero or near to zero”), and the methodology 
 
271. E.g., Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 58-60 (Mass. 
2010). 
272. E.g., United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009); 
id. at 58. 
273. E.g., United States v. Love, No. 10-cr-2418 (MMM), 2011 WL 
2173644, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011). 
274. E.g., Gambora, 933 N.E.2d at 59-60. 
275. E.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541-42 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
276. United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
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employed by the state’s ballistics expert, which allowed him to 
conclude that suspect casings were fired from a rifle found in 
Hicks’s residence, was reliable.277 Both Santiago and Hicks 
afforded firearms identification scientific credit, while focusing 
on precedent and the experience of the examiner to support 
admission. 
A conservative shift manifested in 2005, however. In 
United States v. Green,278 the state sought to admit expert 
testimony that Green’s pistol could be matched, “to the 
exclusion of every other firearm in the world,” to suspect shell 
casings in a racketeering prosecution.279 Judge Nancy Gertner 
of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts held that such a conclusion was extraordinary 
given the data and methods employed by the examiner.280 
Judge Gertner detailed a long list of serious deficiencies in 
the field of firearms identification. She criticized the lack of 
guidelines available to distinguish between class and sub-class 
tool-mark characteristics,281 the heavily subjective nature of 
declaring a match,282 the potential for confirmatory bias to 
skew the examiners results (“the only weapon [the examiner] 
was shown was the suspect one: the only inquiry was whether 
the shell casings found earlier matched it”),283 and the 
examiner’s failure to document his analysis and to follow 
procedure.284 She also vociferously disagreed with the 
 
277. United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004). 
278. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005). 
279. Id. at 107 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
280. Id. at 107. 
281. Id. at 110-13. 
282. Id. at 114. 
283. Id. at 107. 
 
It was, in effect, an evidentiary “show-up,” not what 
scientists would regard as a “blind” test. He was not asked 
to try to match the casings to the other test-fired Hi Point 
weapons in police custody, or any other gun for that matter, 
an examination more equivalent to an evidentiary “line-up.” 
His work was reviewed by another officer, who did the same 
thing—checked his conclusions under the same conditions—
another evidentiary “show-up.” 
 
Id. at 108. 
284. Id. at 114-15. 
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applicable precedents, as “every single court post-Daubert has 
admitted this testimony.”285 Despite all this, Judge Gertner 
reluctantly admitted the expert testimony. However, her 
decision was qualified: 
 
[N]otwithstanding my serious reservations, I feel 
compelled to allow [the state’s expert] to testify 
about his observations of the shell casings . . . , 
and about his comparison of those casings to the 
suspect . . . weapon. . . . However, . . . O’Shea 
may only describe and explain the ways in which 
the earlier casings are similar to the shell 
casings test-fired from the . . . pistol. . . . I will 
not allow him to conclude that the shell casings 
come from a specific . . . pistol . . . to the 
exclusion of every other firearm in the world. 
That conclusion—that there is a definitive 
match—stretches well beyond O’Shea’s data and 
 
285. Id. at 108. 
 
I reluctantly come to the above conclusion because of my 
confidence that any other decision will be rejected by 
appellate courts, in light of precedents across the country, 
regardless of the findings I have made. While I recognize 
that the Daubert-Kumho standard does not require the 
illusory perfection of a television show (CSI, this wasn't), 
when liberty hangs in the balance-and, in the case of the 
defendants facing the death penalty, life itself-the standards 
should be higher than were met in this case, and than have 
been imposed across the country. The more courts admit 
this type of toolmark evidence without requiring 
documentation, proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, 
the more sloppy practices will endure; we should require 
more. 
 
Id. at 109 (footnote omitted). 
 
This reliance on long-standing use of ballistics evidence in 
the courts is troubling. It runs the risk of “grandfathering in 
irrationality,” without reexamining it in the light of Kumho 
and Daubert. It arguably ignores the mandate of Daubert, 
especially where the courts are relying on pre-Daubert 
acceptance of a given scientific technique. 
 
Id. at 123. 
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methodology.286 
 
The same court considered a similar challenge weeks later 
in United States v. Monteiro.287 Monteiro sought to exclude 
expert testimony that suspect cartridge cases matched firearms 
linked to him.288 The court rejected Monteiro’s challenge, 
finding that the underlying scientific principle of 
individualization in firearm identification was valid.289 The 
court found that “the existence of the requirements of peer 
review and documentation ensure sufficient testability and 
reproducibility to ensure that the results of the technique are 
reliable.”290 Despite the subjective judgment involved in 
making an identification, the defendant could conduct her own 
testing, proffer her own experts and use cross examination to 
test the evidence.291 In considering peer review, the court found 
that although “there appears to be a disagreement in the peer 
reviewed literature as to the reliability of the AFTE method of 
identification, consensus is not necessary.”292 With regards to 
error rate, the court concluded that the known error rate is “not 
unacceptably high.”293 The court was troubled that there were 
no universal standards for declaring a match, but found that it 
was not fatal because documentation and peer review helped 
maintain standards.294 Moreover, the examiner’s specialized 
training and experience favored admission.295 
Despite this, Monteiro added to the more conservative 
approach taken in Green. Although the court admitted the 
testimony, again its decision was qualified: 
 
 
 
 
286. Id. at 108-09 (footnote omitted). 
287. 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006). 
288. Id. at 354. 
289. Id. at 355. 
290. Id. at 369. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 367. 
293. Id. at 368. 
294. Id. at 371. 
295. Id. 
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One important caveat: during the 
testimony at the hearing, the examiners testified 
to the effect that they could be [one hundred] 
percent sure of a match. Because an examiner’s 
bottom line opinion as to an identification is 
largely a subjective one, there is no reliable 
statistical or scientific methodology which will 
currently permit the expert to testify that it is a 
“match” to an absolute certainty, or to an 
arbitrary degree of statistical certainty. Allowing 
the firearms examiner to testify to a reasonable 
degree of ballistic certainty permits the expert to 
offer her findings, but does not allow her to say 
more than is currently justified by the prevailing 
methodology.296 
 
As Schwartz explains, the Green and Monteiro decisions 
“took major steps towards recognizing the systemic scientific 
problems and excluding firearms and tool mark 
identifications.”297 Subsequent cases, however, demonstrate 
inconsistent results. 
In the 2007 case of United States v. Natson,298 the court 
ignored Green and Monteiro. In Natson, a firearm examiner 
opined that the tool-marks present on a suspect cartridge were 
an exact match to those produced by Natson’s gun.299 The court 
found that the examiner’s opinion was “based upon a 
scientifically valid methodology.”300 That methodology was 
tested, subjected to peer review, had an ascertainable error 
rate, and was generally accepted in the scientific community.301 
On the other hand, United States v. Diaz302 followed 
Monteiro. In that case, the court found that claims of 
individualization, in the firearms identification field, were not 
 
296. Id. at 372 (emphasis added). 
297. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 10. 
298. 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2007). 
299. Id. at 1254. 
300. Id. at 1261. 
301. Id. 
302. United States v. Diaz, No. 05-cr-00167 (WHA), 2007 WL 485967 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007). 
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supported.303 Thus, the court only allowed the examiners to 
“testify that a match has been made to a reasonable degree of 
certainty in the ballistics field.”304 An examiner’s “keen 
practiced eye for discerning the extent of matching patterns” 
outweighed any concerns about the subjective nature of making 
an identification.305 
In 2008, in United States v. Glynn,306 the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York took a 
different approach to Green, Monteiro, Natson and Diaz. At 
trial, the state sought to introduce expert testimony that “to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” suspect ammunition 
came from firearms linked to Glynn.307 Glynn moved to exclude 
the testimony, arguing the discipline was not based on 
sufficiently reliable methods.308 The court concluded that 
firearms identification “not only lacks the rigor of science but 
suffers from greater uncertainty than many other kinds of 
forensic evidence.”309 However, while the “subjectivity and 
vagueness [involved in firearms identification] might suggest 
that [it] involves little more than a hunch, such a 
characterization would be unfair.”310 This is because the court 
found that the methodology of firearms identification had 
garnered “sufficient empirical support as to warrant its 
admissibility.”311 The court admitted the testimony, but was 
conscious that: 
 
The problem is how to admit it into evidence 
without giving the jury the impression—always a 
risk where forensic evidence is concerned—that 
it has greater reliability than its imperfect 
methodology permits. The problem is 
compounded by the tendency of ballistics experts 
 
303. Id. at *1. 
304. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
305. Id. 
306. United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
307. Id. at 568. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 574. 
310. Id. at 572. 
311. Id. at 574. 
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. . . to make assertions that their matches are 
certain beyond all doubt, that the error rate of 
their methodology is “zero,” and other such 
pretensions. Although effective cross-
examination may mitigate some of these dangers 
. . . when it comes to expert testimony, cross-
examination is inherently handicapped by the 
jury’s own lack of background knowledge, so that 
the Court must play a greater role, not only in 
excluding unreliable testimony, but also in 
alerting the jury to the limitations of what is 
presented.312 
 
The court concluded that allowing the examiner to testify 
that he had matched ammunition to a particular gun “to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” would “seriously 
mislead the jury as to the nature of the expertise involved.”313 
To resolve this problem, the court: (1) limited the examiner to 
testifying that a firearms match was more likely than not; (2) 
prevented the expert from testifying that he reached his 
conclusions to any degree of certainty; and (3) prevented the 
expert from testifying that ballistics was a science.314 
In October 2009, eight months after the publication of the 
NAS Report, United States v. Taylor315 was decided by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. 
Taylor had moved to exclude evidence that his rifle could be 
matched to suspect ammunition in a racketeering 
prosecution.316 The court factored an earlier report from the 
NAS—Ballistic Imaging, Committee to Assess the Feasibility, 
Accuracy, and Technical Capability of a National Ballistics 
Database (“Ballistic Imaging Report”)317—in to its Daubert 
 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at *13-14. 
315. United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D.N.M. 2009). 
316. Id. at 1172. 
317. Id. at 1175-76. The Ballistics Imaging Report was focused on the 
feasibility of a national ballistics database. The Committee emphasized that 
its “report was not meant to be an overall assessment of firearms 
identification as a discipline.” Id. at 1176. 
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analysis. First, with regards to testing, the court acknowledged 
the Ballistic Imaging Report’s findings that (1) “[t]he validity of 
the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and 
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been 
fully demonstrated”318 and (2) “[a] significant amount of 
research would be needed to scientifically determine the degree 
to which firearms-related tool-marks are unique or even to 
qualitatively characterize the probability of uniqueness.”319 
However, on the basis that numerous studies indicated that 
there is “some level of reproducibility,”320 and industry 
standards typically require an examiner to document his 
findings and have them double-checked by another examiner, 
the court found there was “at least some significant level of 
testability and reproducibility.”321 Second, in terms of peer 
review, the court found the existence of the AFTE Journal and 
two articles in the Journal of Forensic Science, both of which 
are peer-reviewed, “clearly weighs in favor of admissibility.”322 
Third, the court found that the discipline’s “error rate [was] 
quite low” on the basis of data from CTS testing carried out 
between 1978 and 1991.323 
The Taylor court considered the 2009 NAS Report in the 
context of controlling standards. The court found that 
“[a]rguably the biggest obstacle facing any firearms examiner 
is that there is no such thing as a ‘perfect match.’”324 The court 
partially attributed this to the circular nature of the AFTE 
 
However, the Committee also recognized that the question 
of the feasibility of a national ballistics database was 
inextricably intertwined with the question of whether a 
particular set of tool marks can be shown to come from one 
weapon to the exclusion of all others, and thus the 
Committee felt compelled to point out the weaknesses in 
that theory. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
318. Id. at 1175. 
319. Id. at 1175-76. 
320. Id. at 1176. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. at 1177. Data from CTS testing carried out between 1978 and 
1991 suggest that the rate of false identification is less than one percent. Id. 
324. Id. 
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Theory of Identification, which “does not provide any uniform 
numerical standard examiners can use to determine whether 
or not there is a match . . . .”325 Thus, much is left to the 
subjective eye of the examiner.326 The court acknowledged that 
the NAS Report had recognized this problem, but did not 
indicate whether such criticism did or did not favor admission 
of the expert testimony.327 However, it did find that the AFTE 
Theory was “generally accepted” because it was widely 
accepted (although not universally followed) by trained 
firearms examiners.328 Following Monteiro and Diaz, the Taylor 
court admitted the firearms evidence, but restricted the 
examiner to testifying that the ammunition came from Taylor’s 
rifle to within a “reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms 
examination field.”329 In so holding, the court noted that 
precedent favored admission, but accepted that a more 
conservative approach towards firearms identification had 
slowly begun to build. 
In 2011, the decision in Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang330 
caused further inconsistency. In that case, Pytou Heang alleged 
that the trial court had erred in allowing the state’s expert to 
testify that his AB-10 handgun had fired ammunition involved 
in the crime.331 The court acknowledged that the accuracy, 
reliability and scientific basis of firearms identification had 
been critiqued in the Ballistics Imaging Report and the NAS 
Report.332 Thus, the court found two main problems with 
firearms identification: (1) “there is little scientific proof 
supporting the theory that each firearm imparts ‘unique’ 
individual characteristic toolmarks on to [ammunition];” and 
 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 1177-78. In addition to the issues surrounding the AFTE 
Protocol, the court noted an additional problem with firearms identification – 
confirmatory bias. The court acknowledged that it is typical practice for an 
examiner to be handed only one suspect weapon and the recovered 
ammunition, which creates “a potentially significant ‘observer effect’ whereby 
the examiner knows that he is testing a suspect weapon and may be 
predisposed to find a match.” Id. at 1179. 
328. Id. at 1178. 
329. Id. at 1180. 
330. Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 2011). 
331. Id. at 937-38. 
332. Id. at 938. 
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(2) the matching of individual characteristics is highly 
subjective.333 In light of these concerns, and to inject more 
reliability into the firearms identification process, the court 
designed a three-part approach that was to be taken by 
firearms examiners when testifying: 
 
First, before trial, the examiner must adequately 
document the findings or observations that 
support the examiner’s ultimate opinion, and 
this documentary evidence, whether in the form 
of measurements, notes, sketches, or 
photographs, shall be provided in discovery, so 
that defense counsel will have an adequate and 
informed basis to cross-examine the forensic 
ballistics expert at trial. . . . 
Second, before an opinion is offered at 
trial, a forensic ballistics expert should explain to 
the jury the theories and methodologies 
underlying the field of forensic ballistics. . . . 
Third, in the absence of special 
circumstances casting doubt on the reliability of 
an opinion . . . a forensic ballistics expert may 
present an expert’s opinion of the toolmarks 
found on projectiles and cartridge casings. Where 
a qualified expert has identified sufficient 
individual characteristic toolmarks reasonably to 
offer an opinion that a particular firearm fired a 
projectile or cartridge casing recovered as 
evidence, the expert may offer that opinion to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.334 
 
However, the court neither retroactively applied nor 
prospectively required this approach in Pytou Heang’s case. 
Instead, the court denied the appeal and sanctioned the state’s 
claim of individualization between the suspect ammunition and 
the defendant’s AB-10 hand-gun.335 The court found that 
 
333. Id. at 941. 
334. Id. at 944-45 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
335. Id. at 944. 
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although the state’s expert had testified that the suspect 
ammunition was “fired by that AB–10,” and that in his opinion 
it was a “practical impossibility” that the ammunition came 
from any other AB–10 firearm, there was no prejudicial 
error.336 This was because the jury had been adequately 
informed of the limitations surrounding firearms identification 
throughout the entire proceedings.337 
A number of American courts have changed their approach 
to the admissibility of firearms identification evidence between 
2004 and 2011. All of the aforementioned cases (except 
Santiago, Hicks, and Natson) have moved firearms examiners 
away from making claims of individualization by restricting 
them to specific terminology and phrases, which allegedly 
reflect less absolute conclusions. Overall, courts have taken 
this approach because of concerns about the subjectivity of 
firearms identification and its lack of empirical underpinnings 
for claims of individualization. The impact this approach has 
on jurors is important to understand because numerous studies 
have shown that “jurors place special trust in expert[s]” and 
scientific evidence.338 Furthermore, studies have shown jurors 
to rate firearms examiners as among the most honest, 
competent and influential experts.339 
Some scholars have labelled Green, Monteiro, and Glynn as 
“victories” for the defense and for the veracity of science.340 
However, does restricting firearms examiners to phrases such 
as “to a reasonable degree of certainty” and “more likely than 
not” deter jurors from thinking there is a “match” between 
suspect ammunition and a known weapon? A recent study by 
Saks and McQuiston-Surrett suggests the answer is no.341 In 
that study, both judges and jurors were found to be comfortable 
 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
338. Brandon Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009). 
339. Michael Saks & Roselle Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of 
Expert Testimony, Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435, 
445 (1984). 
340. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 10. 
341. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael Saks, Communicating Opinion 
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1188-89 (2008). 
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converting subjective probability evidence into findings of 
liability.342 Moreover, does cross-examination and testimony 
about the shortcomings of firearms identification neutralize 
any exaggerated trust jurors place in experts? Again, the Saks 
and McQuiston-Surret study suggests the answer is no: 
 
One might have expected an explication of 
the examination process, emphasizing the 
guesswork involved, would have a sobering effect 
on fact finders, but it appears instead to lead fact 
finders to be more impressed by the examination. 
Similarly, since most jurors begin with an 
exaggerated view of the nature and capabilities 
of forensic identification, one might expect that 
information explicitly informing fact finders 
about the limitations of the expertise would 
temper the jurors’ inferences. Such information 
had little effect on jurors’ judgments.343 
 
Thus, there is reason to believe that the changes adopted 
by multiple courts between 2004 and 2011 in order to confront 
the weaknesses behind claims of individualization in this field, 
may not have the desired effect. This is perhaps unsurprising. 
As Schwartz argues, “The problems with firearms and 
toolmark examiners’ testimony are not linguistic, however, but 
scientific: the requisite empirical and statistical foundations 
have not been laid for either absolute or probabilistic 
identification conclusions.”344 
 
C. Bite Mark Identification 
 
In the past, forensic odontologists have been skeptical 
about their ability to engage in individualization.345 Despite 
these reservations, the majority of American courts have 
welcomed the admission of bite mark identification evidence 
 
342. Id. 
343. Id. at 1188. 
344. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 14. 
345. Saks, supra note 3, at 1119. 
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since the 1980s. In fact, Saks argues that the courts have 
“convinced” the forensic odontology community of their ability 
to identify a perpetrator “to the exclusion of all others.”346 A 
snapshot of cases decided between 1999 and 2011, demonstrate 
that despite what is now significant, external criticism of the 
discipline’s veracity, courts resist challenges to the 
admissibility of bite mark identification evidence and, at times, 
turn a blind eye to unsettling expert practices. 
In Brooks v. State,347 Brooks had been convicted of capital 
murder based, in part, on the testimony of Dr. Michael West, 
who testified that two dentations present on the victim’s body 
had been made by Brooks.348 Brooks claimed that his trial court 
erred in admitting West’s testimony because he was not an 
expert in forensic odontology.349 The Supreme Court of 
Mississippi held that Brooks’s claim was procedurally barred, 
but because bite mark evidence was “controversial,” the court 
would address the issue’s merits.350 Despite concerns about 
West and the fact other experts found inconsistencies between 
the bite mark and Brooks’s teeth,351 the majority took the 
chance to “state affirmatively that bite mark identification 
evidence is admissible in Mississippi.”352 The court followed 
precedent, stating that because Brooks had the opportunity “to 
attack the qualifications of the expert, the methods and data 
used to compare the bite marks to persons other than the 
defendant, and the factual and logical bases of the expert’s 
opinions.”353 In addition, Brooks had presented his own 
experts.354 
 
 
346. Id. at 1119-20. 
347. Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999). 
348. Id. at 739. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. at 740. 
352. Id. at 739. Note that Justices Banks, Waller and Sullivan did not 
agree with this approach in their concurring judgment. Id. at 747 (Banks, J., 
concurring). Justice McRae did not agree with this approach in his dissenting 
judgment. Id. at 748 (McRae, J, dissenting). 
353. Id. at 739 (quoting Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274, 288 (Miss. 
1997)). 
354. Id. at 740. 
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Despite this result, the Brooks case demonstrates some 
rumblings of disquiet about bite mark evidence in the courts 
before the eve of the new millennium, as Justice McRae filed a 
detailed dissent arguing: 
 
The majority takes the opportunity to 
conclude once and for all that forensic odontology 
evidence is universally admissible . . . regardless 
of the quality of that evidence and regardless of 
the fact that the proponent of that evidence 
claims that two indentations are teeth marks 
unique to one person in the world. This is done 
despite the fact that the discipline is without any 
universal criteria or methodology. I dissent 
because, not only do I have qualms about 
proclaiming that bite-mark evidence is 
admissible to specifically identify a person and 
exclude everyone else, I also have reservations 
about Michael West’s unmatched ability to 
conclude that no one other than the defendant 
could have produced the marks on the deceased 
especially where, as here, other experts are 
unwilling to testify that the marks could only be 
bite marks and not something else.355 
 
Judge McRae’s concerns were based on criticism about the 
reliability of bite mark evidence,356 the sore divide between 
expert opinions,357 and “West’s propensity for testifying with a 
confidence seen in no other expert.”358 Justice McRae detailed 
many concerns about West, including that he had materially 
misrepresented evidence and data, used methods not founded 
on scientific principles and claimed to have expertise in a vast 
array of identification disciplines.359 Justice McRae concluded 
that the majority’s “apparent willingness to allow West to 
testify to anything and everything so long as the defense is 
 
355. Id. at 747-48 (McRae, J., dissenting). 
356. Id. at 748. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. at 749. 
359. Id. at 749-50. 
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permitted to cross-examine him may be expedient for 
prosecutors but it is harmful to the criminal justice system.”360 
Given the benefit of hindsight, Justice McRae made a very 
pertinent point—Brooks was exonerated by DNA evidence in 
2008.361 
Prior to Brooks’s exoneration, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court relied on West’s testimony again in Stubbs v. State.362 In 
that case, Stubbs was convicted of, inter alia, an aggravated 
assault and subsequently challenged the admission of bite 
mark evidence against her.363 At trial, West testified that the 
victim had bite marks on her hip and that Stubbs could not be 
excluded from being the donor.364 West concluded this after he 
had pressed the dental mold of Stubbs’s teeth on to the victim’s 
skin.365 Again, the court found that West was an expert in 
forensic odontology, and because the adversary system allowed 
Stubbs to attack West’s testimony, the trial court had not erred 
in admitting West’s evidence.366 In so holding, the court relied 
heavily on precedent.367 In June 2012, Stubbs’s aggravated 
assault conviction was vacated.368 
In 2010, over one year after the publication of the NAS 
Report, the Court of Appeals of Kansas decided State v. Lopez-
Martinez.369 In that case, a rape victim alleged that she had 
 
360. Id. at 750 (footnote omitted). 
361. Levon Brooks Exonerated in Mississippi, Forensic Reforms 
Underway, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Levon_Brooks_Exonerated_in_Missi
ssippi_Forensic_Reforms_Underway.php. 
362. Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 2003). 
363. Id. at 657. 
364. Id. at 662. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 669. 
367. Id. In 2006, the same court followed suit in Howard v. State when 
reaffirming Eddie Howard’s death sentence. 945 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2007). In 
that case, West had testified that to a “reasonable degree of certainty” 
Howard's teeth matched a bite mark on the victim. Id. at 333. The court 
found Howard’s claims were procedurally barred and without merit. Id. at 
371. 
368. Caleb Bedillion, Women Taste Freedom After Convictions Vacated, 
THE DAILY LEADER, June 30, 2012, 
http://www.dailyleader.com/news/article_39b7af80-c20c-11e1-81a4-
001a4bcf887a.html. 
369. State v. Lopez-Martinez, No. 100, 643, 2010 WL 2545626 (Kan. 
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bitten her attacker on the shoulder.370 Lopez said the bite mark 
on his shoulder was given to him by a young relative when the 
two were roughhousing.371 At trial, an expert testified that the 
victim’s teeth matched the bite mark on Lopez, and Lopez was 
convicted.372 On appeal, Lopez argued that there was no 
consensus with regards to the method or reliability of bite 
mark evidence and therefore the expert’s testimony should 
have been inadmissible.373 In support, Lopez provided 
information about a 1999 study, which reported a sixty-three 
percent error rate in bite mark analyses.374 However, the court 
found this did not outweigh a clear 1980 precedent—State v. 
Peoples.375 In Peoples, the court had held that bite mark 
identification evidence was reliable and valuable to a jury.376 
The Lopez court stated “we find no indication that our Supreme 
Court is departing from its holding in Peoples. Without such an 
indication, we are compelled to follow Peoples.”377 
Despite this, Lopez-Martinez still represents a court feeling 
uneasy about not revisiting precedent in light of the criticism of 
bite mark identification. In his concurring judgment, Judge 
 
App. June 11, 2010). 
370. Id. at *1. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at *2. 
374. Id. (“Relying on articles in several periodicals, including a 2007 
article in the New York Times regarding a 1999 study which reported a sixty-
three percent rate of misidentifications in bite mark analyses, Lopez–
Martinez argues that the reliability of bite mark evidence is now in serious 
doubt.”). 
375. 605 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980). 
376. Id. at 132. 
 
[B]ite-mark identification by an expert witness is 
sufficiently reliable and can be a valuable aid to a jury in 
understanding and interpreting evidence in a criminal case. 
When the witness has the requisite skill and experience, 
and demonstrates the accuracy and reliability of his models, 
photographs, X-rays and supporting exhibits in bite mark 
identification, the trial court in exercise of its power of 
discretion may properly admit the opinion testimony of the 
expert witness. 
 
Id. 
377. Lopez-Martinez, 2010 WL 2545626, at *2. 
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Leben noted that the NAS Report, along with other sources, 
“found that the uniqueness of human teeth had not been 
scientifically established.”378 He concluded: “The Peoples 
decision was issued more than 30 years ago, which is a long 
time when considering the lifespan of a modern scientific 
method’s validity. . . . But reliance solely on past cases can be a 
problematic method for continued acceptance of scientific 
tests.”379 
However, in a further display of reluctance to find bite 
mark evidence unreliable in the face of significant criticism, a 
federal court in Texas admitted bite mark evidence in a highly 
emotional case in 2011. In United States v. Bourgeois,380 the 
court refused to “brush aside the heart-wrenching testimony 
the jury heard” simply because the defendant proffered 
technical, scientific testimony that “[t]he bite-marks found on 
the victim cannot be traced to [him] with certainty any greater 
than guess work.”381 The court’s judgment made no reference to 
the NAS Report. 
The Brooks, Stubbs, Howard, Lopez-Martinez and 
Bourgeois cases generally support Beecher-Monas’s argument 
that: 
 
When defense counsel do challenge bite-
mark testimony, they are rarely successful. 
Courts simply decline to engage in any serious 
analysis of these challenges. By far the most 
widely used gate-keeping avoidance technique 
that judges employ is admitting bite-mark 
evidence because other courts have done so. 
Rather than engage in any analysis of the 
scientific principles on which the testimony is 
based, the data underlying the testimony, the 
methodology, error rate, or general acceptance by 
the scientific community, these courts skirt the 
 
378. Id. at *4 (Leben, J., concurring). 
379. Id. 
380. United States v. Bourgeois, No. C-02-cr-216, 2011 WL 1930684 
(S.D. Tex. May 19, 2011). 
381. Id. at *95 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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entire issue . . . .382 
 
The aforementioned cases also demonstrate that experts 
use a variety of terms to explain their conclusions. These range 
from declaring a “match” to probabilistic phrases such as 
“consistent with” and “reasonable scientific certainty.”383 Again, 
as discussed in relation to firearms identification, there is 
reason to believe that these phrases do not have the desired 
effect, that is, to deter jurors from thinking that there is a 
certain strength of connection between the defendant and 
suspect evidence.384 
A further concern about the courts’ willingness to embrace 
bite mark analysis, and place reliance on ABFO guidelines, is 
that studies suggest that the terms used by bite mark 
examiners are not being interpreted by jurors in the way the 
ABFO intended. For example, under ABFO guidelines a 
“match” simply means there is “some concordance” or “some 
similarity” between two samples and the examiner does not 
intend to make an expression of specificity.385 Although a 
“match” is the weakest link an expert can make between a 
suspect bite mark and a defendant, a 2008 study found that 
people interpreted the word to indicate the strongest 
association between crime scene evidence and its source.386 
 
D. Arson Analysis 
 
For years, fire investigators have been testifying that 
physical signs such as pour patterns, “spider-web” glass, brown 
stains on floors, and “V” shaped soot marks indicate that a fire 
was incendiary. Investigators have picked up these alleged 
signs of arson through experience. Since 1990, however, 
scientific understanding about the behavior of both accidental 
and incendiary fires has advanced. In 1990, an elaborate 
experiment – the Lime Street Fire Experiment – was 
 
382. Beecher-Monas, supra note 103, at 1395 (footnote omitted). 
383. McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 341, at 1162. 
384. Id. at 1162-63. 
385. Id. at 1162 tbl.I. 
386. Id. at 1163. 
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conducted.387 Without using an accelerant, investigators set fire 
to a couch in a house and watched as “flashover”—the point at 
which radiant heat causes a fire in a room to become a room on 
fire—occurred.388 In short, investigators found that the classic 
signs of arson, like pour patterns and “V” patterns, can also 
appear on their own, i.e., without accelerant, after flashover.389 
Thus, the evidential foundations of many arson convictions 
have been undermined.390 
In 2004, Alfred Albrecht Senior applied for post-conviction 
relief on the basis that advances in fire science constituted 
newly discovered evidence that proved his innocence.391 
Albrecht had been convicted of capital murder after the state 
produced evidence that he had used an accelerant to set a 
house fire that killed his wife, mother and daughter.392 This 
evidence included the presence of burn patterns in the house 
and evidence of past threats from Albrecht to his wife.393 
In Albrecht, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania opined: 
 
Petitioner has convincingly shown that 
the fire science evidence presented by the 
Commonwealth at his trial has since been 
discredited. . . . He presented evidence that 
modern fire science considers the 
Commonwealth’s trial evidence to be an 
unreliable basis upon which to conclude that a 
liquid accelerant necessarily was involved and 
that the fire could have been caused only by 
arson. In short, Petitioner’s expert testified that 
the fire science evidence in this case was as 
 
387. JOHN J. LENTINI, THE LIME STREET FIRE: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE 1 
(1992), available at 
http://www.firescientist.com/Documents/TheLimeStreetFire-
AnotherPerspective.pdf. 
388. Id. at 2. 
389. Id. at 3. 
390. Grann, supra note 115. 
391. Albrecht v. Horn, 314 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (E.D. Pa. 2004), vacated 
on other grounds by, 485 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2007). 
392. Id. at 455-56. 
393. Id. at 455-57. 
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consistent with an accidental fire—started in an 
upholstered chair in the living room as claimed 
by Petitioner—as with an accelerant fire 
intentionally started in either the kitchen or the 
living room.394 
 
The court accepted that the fire could have been caused 
“either intentionally or by accident,” but still rejected Albrecht’s 
claim.395 The court reasoned that because circumstantial 
evidence existed, namely a gas can covered in soot with 
Albrecht’s fingerprints on it being found in Albrecht’s truck and 
reports of domestic abuse, there was sufficient evidence to 
support a rational inference that the fire was caused by 
arson.396 As the advances in science only supported the idea 
that the fire might have been accidental, and did not 
completely “foreclose the possibility that the fire was started by 
an arsonist using a liquid accelerant,” the court found that 
Albrecht’s situation did not merit relief.397 
A similar approach was taken by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Ferranti 
v United States.398 In that 2010 case, Ferranti had been 
convicted of a number of arson related crimes, after being 
charged with setting fire to his business – “Today’s Styles.”399 
Fire investigators testified that burn patterns found at the 
scene suggested the fire was started by an accelerant and 
circumstantial evidence, including that the business was in 
financial turmoil, suggested Ferranti was the arsonist.400 Dr. 
Gerald Hurst testified on behalf of the defense, arguing “the 
prosecution’s case failed to establish the corpus of arson by 
contemporary scientific standards.”401 The court was unshaken 
by the scientific advancements proffered by Ferranti: 
 
394. Id. at 464-65. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. at 465-66. 
397. Id. at 465. 
398. Ferranti v. United States, No. 05-cv-5222 (ERK), 2010 WL 307445 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010). 
399. Id. at *1. 
400. Id. at *2. 
401. Id. at *8. 
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Ferranti simply has not established that no 
reasonable fact finder would have found him . . . 
guilty of the underlying offense. Even assuming 
that Hurst’s declaration is credible, at best it 
would neutralize the testimony of [the] Fire 
Marshals . . . that the irregular burn patterns 
were evidence of the presence of accelerants. 
Hurst declared that the irregular burn patterns 
seen here may result from post-ignition 
flashover, and as such, they were equally 
consistent with an accidental fire as they were 
with arson. What Hurst’s declaration does not 
say, however, is that the fire was initiated by an 
electrical malfunction or some other accidental 
means. . . . Moreover, much of the other evidence 
submitted by Ferranti . . . which could have 
caused the burn patterns . . . serves only to 
neutralize the testimony of . . . Stickevers and 
Kelty [the Fire Marshals] regarding the burn 
patterns, but none of that evidence establishes 
that the fire was started accidentally.402 
 
Albrecht and Ferranti suggest that courts are placing 
extremely high burdens on defendants applying for post-
conviction relief. The courts in both of these cases demanded 
certainty of the defendant’s innocence. As Keith Findley 
argues, “while the notion of ‘innocence’ does indeed mean 
factual innocence, in the sense that the defendant committed 
no crime—to demand certainty is to demand the impossible . . . 
.”403 
In Green v. Koerner,404 the United States District Court for 
the District of Kansas afforded greater weight to a defendant’s 
behavior than advances in science.405 In that 2008 case, Debora 
Green appealed her conviction for the murders of her two 
 
402. Id. at *12 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
403. Keith Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1161 
(2011). 
404. No. 07-3262 (RDR), 2008 WL 2079469 (D. Kan. May 15, 2008). 
405. Id. at *4-5. 
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children by setting their home on fire in 1996.406 The appeal 
was based on advances in fire science. The U.S. District Court 
denied the appeal, citing the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion 
that placed circumstantial evidence of her motive and 
demeanor over that of the scientific developments in arson.407 
For example, the court gave more weight to Green’s “casual 
and nonchalant” police interview408 and the presence of a book 
in her bedroom about children being killed in an intentionally 
set fire,409 than scientific advancements that called into 
question whether the fire was arson at all.410 
The case of United States v Aman411 suggests that the 
publication of the NAS Report has not changed the courts’ 
reluctance to embrace scientific advancements in the field of 
arson investigation. In that case, Aman challenged the 
admissibility of the state fire investigator’s evidence on that 
the basis that he did not use a reliable methodology, as 
required by Daubert.412 The fire investigator had followed 
procedures set out in the National Fire Protection Agency’s 
Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations 921 (“NFPA 
921”).413 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia found that “[b]ecause the methodology described in 
NFPA 921 has been peer reviewed, is generally accepted in the 
field of fire investigation, and incorporates the classic scientific 
methodology of ‘generating hypotheses and testing them to see 
if they can be falsified,’” it satisfied Daubert.414 An error rate 
was not strictly required.415 The court reasoned that the NAS 
 
406. Id. at *1. 
407. State v. Green, 153 P.3d 1216, 1227 (Kan. 2007). 
408. Id. at 1220. 
409. Id. 
410. Koerner, 2008 WL 2079469, at *2. 
411. United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
412. Id. at 535. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. at 536 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 593 (1993)). 
415. Id. 
 
While a known error rate is also a factor to be considered in 
a Daubert analysis, a known error rate is not strictly 
required under Daubert (emphasizing that the Daubert 
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Report did not alter this conclusion. This was because (1) the 
NAS Report does not recommend barring fire investigators 
from testifying based on the NFPA 921 methodology;416 and (2) 
the NAS Report does not bind federal courts.417 Furthermore, 
Aman could challenge the methodology via cross-
examination.418 
Between 2000 and 2011, defendants convicted of arson 
related crimes have used scientific advances to apply for post-
conviction relief. Most defendants have argued that the new 
science equates to “newly discovered evidence” and/ or evidence 
of “actual innocence.” Cases decided in this period of time 
suggest that courts remain unpersuaded by arguments that 
these advances in fire analysis undermine the traditional 
hallmarks of arson investigation. It appears that courts prefer 
to take the word of experience-based investigators over those of 
scientists who have conducted empirical experiments. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Law is a consumer of a broad spectrum of forensic sciences, 
including fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite 
mark identification, and arson investigation. Over the last 
century, the law has, and continues to rely on these disciplines 
to help it answer important legal questions. Often, experts in 
these fields have testified that the methodologies of their 
discipline allow them to identify the perpetrator of a crime to 
the exclusion of all others. As such, these disciplines have 
become a mainstay of the American criminal justice system 
that reflects a smooth and mutually convenient relationship 
between law and science. 
 
 
factors are not a “definitive checklist,” and that the inquiry 
envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one). In all, analysis 
of the Daubert factors do not justify excluding Robbins'[s] 
methodology as unreliable. 
 
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
416. Id. at 536. 
417. Id. 
418. Id. 
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However, since the arrival of DNA evidence in the late 
1980s, the bar for what evidence is scientifically reliable has 
been raised. To date, 302 people have been exonerated by post-
conviction DNA testing, and over half of these wrongful 
convictions can be attributed, in some way, to deficiencies and 
errors in forensic science. Furthermore, these serious 
deficiencies have been explored in detail and acknowledged by 
the National Academy of Sciences and United States Supreme 
Court respectively. Resultantly, a vast array of forensic 
sciences, including fingerprint identification, firearms 
identification, bite mark identification, and arson investigation, 
have been subject to mounting scientific and scholarly 
criticism. Critics argue that these disciplines are not 
underpinned by the scientific method, have unknown error-
rates, rely heavily on subjective and experience based 
evaluations which can diverge widely, allow for overstated 
conclusions, and are governed by inadequate standards. As a 
consequence, between 1999 and 2011, the admissibility of 
evidence from each of these four disciplines has been 
increasingly challenged under Daubert. Defendants convicted 
of arson have also used advancements in fire science to make 
“newly discovered evidence” and “innocence” claims in post-
conviction relief procedures. 
A snapshot of criminal court responses to legal challenges 
concerning friction ridge analysis, tool-mark analysis, forensic 
odontology, and fire science between 1999 and 2011 allows us 
to make a number of general observations: (1) Despite 
significant criticism concerning the veracity of these four 
disciplines, the overwhelming majority of courts continue to 
admit such evidence. (2) In admitting such evidence, courts 
rely heavily on precedent to support their conclusions and on 
the adversary system’s ability to weed out unreliable practices 
and conclusions. (3) To different extents, courts are engaging 
the Daubert standard and the Daubert factors. However, 
numerous courts are taking inconsistent and, at times, 
contradictory approaches to applying Daubert. (4) Numerous 
courts have engaged, to differing degrees, with the criticism 
aimed at these four disciplines. In response to certain 
criticisms, and in order to inject more reliability into the 
evidence admitted, some courts have set out more precise 
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procedures for testifying experts to follow, rejected 
untraditional evidence, and refused to allow experts to testify 
to matches between the defendant and suspect evidence. 
Whether these practices deter fact finders from incorrectly 
finding liability, however, is questionable. (5) To differing 
degrees, numerous courts have engaged the NAS Report across 
all four disciplines. To date, the NAS Report has not led any 
court to conclude that evidence from any of these four 
disciplines is inadmissible. Some court’s discussions of the NAS 
Report suggest that the report contains some contradictory or 
confusing conclusions. To support their decisions to admit 
evidence, multiple courts have relied on the fact that the NAS 
Report does not intend to determine the admissibility of 
evidence in a particular case. 
These general observations highlight the cultural 
differences between law and science. In short, although law 
and science both seek truth, they take different paths to find it, 
and, as many of the cases discussed in this article highlight, 
law’s desire to seek the truth often comes in second behind its 
need to determine legal proof. Perhaps this is understandable 
because law must serve as a way of organizing societies by 
providing stability and predictability, whereas science is 
encouraged to embrace new ideas so that we can better 
understand the natural world. Science is not constrained in the 
many ways law is. Despite the growing criticism aimed at 
fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite mark 
identification, and arson investigation, experts continue to use 
and testify to techniques that have never been scientifically 
validated. Moreover, judges seem ill-equipped to recognize the 
distinctions between valid and invalid forensic science. Law 
remains ill-equipped to incorporate changes in these disciplines 
because law is beholden to finality and predictability. 
Generally, judges seem to be unable to recognize invalidated 
methods or unwilling to banish long-accepted, but unsupported 
scientific assertions from the courtroom, perhaps through fear 
of upsetting the criminal justice system in unpredictable ways. 
As a consequence of these cultural clashes, when forensic 
science develops, as it inevitably does, law responds slowly, 
reluctantly, and often inconsistently. 
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